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ABSTRACT: Recent custody decisions in the United States have treated paid
in-home caretakers as substitutes for parents who are either unavailable or
unable to care for their children. They have created a legal category of"nanny"
that detaches primary caretaking from the caretaker and attributes care provided
by in-home caretakers to paying parents. This category fits well with the legal
regime of parental exclusivity, which promotes a nuclear family model, and
with cultural norms that encourage parents to utilize intensive, development-
focused childrearing methods.
This Article argues that this new approach rests on flawed and potentially
harmful assumptions about parenting and caretaking. Detaching the care from
the caretaker is artificial and contradicts the well-established judicial and
legislative view that performing hands-on caretaking tasks over time creates a
parent-child bond. Attributing paid caretakers' labor to hiring parents is unjust:
it devalues care work, renders paid caretakers disposable, and places the
majority of parents, who cannot afford in-home caretaking, in a
disadvantageous position. Furthermore, it endangers the feminist effort to
promote policies that allow women to better combine motherhood with
workforce participation. This Article urges readers to rethink conventional
understandings of parenting and caretaking and to recognize the price that the
current legal approach exacts-and who pays it.
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Sometimes parents have trouble taking care of their children and need
other people's help. Maybe work or other obligations require that they spend a
considerable amount of time away from their children. Maybe they find it
difficult to cope with the challenges that childrearing brings. Although these
circumstances are very different, some courts have recently suggested that the
solution for both working parents and inadequate parents might be similar-
hire an in-home paid caretaker, or "nanny."'
'
In-home caretaking is the most expensive solution to the problem of child
care. 2 Because the Census Bureau's statistics make no distinction between in-
home caretakers, neighbors, friends, and casual babysitters, 3 it is hard to know
exactly how many parents employ in-home caretakers. However, research
indicates that this practice is prevalent in dual-career households. 4 In the winter
of 2002, 3.5% of children under the age of one, and 6% of children between
one- and two-years-old, were cared for in their homes by non-relatives. In total,
3.7% of children under the age of five fell into this category. Children of
employed mothers spent an average of twenty-nine hours weekly with in-home
non-relative caretakers.
5
1. Courts regularly use the gendered term "nanny," which potentially romanticizes the reality of
paid in-home caretaking by invoking a Mary Poppins-like figure-a skilled unmarried white woman
who cheerfully functions as a surrogate mother. Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward a Global Critical
Feminist Vision: Domestic Work and the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 18-21
(1999). To avoid similar connotations, this Article uses the terms "paid in-home caretaker," "paid
caretaker," and "in-home caretaker" interchangeably, to refer to the same phenomenon: caretakers who
regularly spend a substantial number of hours in the home of their employers performing child care
labor. The analysis is not limited to live-in caretakers but refers to all caretakers who work full-time in
the homes of the employers. It excludes other types of caretakers, like paid caretakers who provide
random or infrequent care ("babysitters"); non-paid caretakers (such as relatives, friends, or neighbors);
paid caretakers who provide care in their own home or in a day care center; and paid caretakers who
provide care to adults. Following Martha Fineman, this Article uses the term "caretaker" rather than
"caregiver," which implies that nurture work should be given as a gift. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9
(1995). This Article refers to paid in-home caretakers using female pronouns because the majority of
paid in-home caretakers are women. See infra note 182.
2. Mary Romero, Nanny Diaries and Other Stories: Imagining Immigrant Women's Labor in the
Social Reproduction ofAmerican Families, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 809, 832 (2003).
3. Paid in-home caretakers fall under the Census's category of "non-relative care in the child's
home." Julia Overturf Johnson, Who's Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Winter 2002, in
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 3 (U.S. Census Bureau, No. P70-101, 2005).
4. See, e.g., ROSANNA HERTZ, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL-CAREER
MARRIAGES 159 (1986) (finding that hiring an individual caretaker to take care of children in their home
or in the caretaker's home "is the most common form of child-care used by dual-career couples"); JULIA
WRIGLEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S CHILDREN, at ix n.1 (1995) (quoting research that found that almost a third
of parents with advanced degrees hired in-home caretakers in 1991 ).
5. Johnson, supra note 3, at 7. It seems the report editors' assumption is that mothers are
responsible for children's care, and the data refers to employed and unemployed mothers only.
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In some of the instances in which child care arrangements come to judicial
attention, as in divorce actions, in-home caretaking has become a factor in the
custody decision. This Article explores a set of recent custody and visitation
decisions that treat paid in-home caretakers as supplementing parents who are
unable or unavailable to care for their children. In a small number of
extraordinary cases, courts ordered parents to employ an in-home caretaker,
whereas in other cases judges credited parents who had voluntarily done so.
Despite their different circumstances, all of these cases offer a glimpse into
how courts perceive paid in-home caretaking in relation to parenting. While
none of these decisions has consciously addressed the role of paid in-home
caretakers in the household, judges reveal their conceptions of in-home
caretaking implicitly, both in what is taken for granted and in what is rejected
without question. By analyzing these "nanny cases" together with cases in
which judges analogize unpaid third parties who are denied a parental
prerogative to paid in-home caretakers, this Article unravels the assumptions
courts make about caretakers and parents, examines them from a broad legal
and cultural perspective, and challenges their validity.
This Article argues that the legal category of "nanny" that emerges from
these cases detaches primary caretaking from the caretaker. Courts treat paid
caretakers as disposable by attributing their work in its entirety to the hiring
parent and by insisting that paid caretakers play no parental role. This
conceptualization is potentially detrimental to both parents and caretakers.
Furthermore, it has the potential to undermine feminist attempts to promote
policies that would allow women to combine motherhood with workforce
participation. While recent recognition of parents'-usually mothers'-role as
the supervisors of their children's caretaking is a positive step, 6 the complete
denial of the parental role of caretakers may negatively affect women in at least
three circumstances: when they work as in-home caretakers; when they cannot
afford in-home caretakers; and-under the prevalent "best interest of the child"
standard-when their former husbands can afford in-home caretakers.
In order to make sense of the appeal of paid in-home caretaking, I situate
the "nanny cases" in the broader context of the legal regime and cultural trends
that regulate contemporary parenthood. Two processes intersect in determining
how the legal system conceives of paid in-home caretaking. One is the ongoing
debate about the parental exclusivity doctrine that, by and large, still governs
legal parenthood in the United States. This doctrine ordains that children can
only have one set of two parents at any given time, and that parents should
6. For example, the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution from 2000 define "caretaking functions"
as, inter alia, "tasks ... that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by others."
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(5), at 108 (2000). For the claim that mothers are usually the managers of
their children's rearing, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REv. 615,661 (1992).
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prevail over non-parents with regards to rights, privileges, and duties.7 The
other process is a shift in the dominant ideology of parenthood from a focus on
the mother-child relationship to an emphasis on child-centered, development-
focused childrearing methods.8 Together these processes construct a particular
model of what is good for children when they are not in the direct care of
parents: a parent-like figure that focuses closely on children's development
without posing a threat to parental authority and autonomy.
The combination of legal and cultural regulations of parenting with the
notion that the care provided by in-home caretakers can be attributed to the
parents makes paid in-home caretaking seem like a highly desirable child care
arrangement. Conceived as primary care detached from a caretaker, in-home
caretaking becomes compatible with parental exclusivity because it is the least
intrusive to parental autonomy. By hiring in-home caretakers, parents are able
to retain control over the upbringing of their children and are less likely to
expose themselves to controversies over third party access to their children.
This creates a paradox because the conceptualization that makes paid in-home
caretaking such an attractive child care solution may also account for a subset
of intrusive cases in which courts have ordered divorcing parents to employ an
in-home caretaker. Detaching care from the caretaker also turns paid in-home
caretaking into an ideal solution under the prevalent middle-class ideology of
parenting, which emphasizes children's intellectual development and requires
constant attention, highly structured schedules, and strict parental control over
content.
9
This Article challenges the assumptions that courts make about paid in-
home caretaking, particularly the distinction between the care and the person
providing it, and highlights the costs of these assumptions for parents and
caretakers. The Article begins by presenting the "nanny cases": custody and
visitation decisions in which courts credited parents for employing paid
caretakers or required them to do so. Part II examines these cases in the context
of the parental exclusivity doctrine and compares paid in-home caretaking to
other child care arrangements, like day care and kin care, in order to further
illuminate the unique conceptualization of in-home caretaking and reveal its
implications for the many who cannot afford this child care solution. Part III
moves from law to its cultural setting and analyzes the legal conceptualization
of paid caretakers in light of the cultural regulation of parenting. It draws on the
accumulated sociological data about paid in-home caretaking to assess the idea
7. The term "exclusive parenthood" was coined by Katharine T. Bartlett. See Katharine T. Bartlett,
Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status.- The Needfor Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 879 (1984). For a detailed discussion of this doctrine,
see infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section lII.A.
9. Joan C. Tronto, The "Nanny" Question in Feminism, 17 HYPATIA 34, 43 (2002). For a detailed
discussion of this child-rearing ideology, see infra Section lII.A.
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that in-home caretakers may replace unavailable or inadequate parents, so that
children receive the intense attention they are now thought to require.
The goal of this Article is not to offer a new set of rules for deciding
custody cases. Nor is it to pass moral judgment on the employment of
caretakers to care for children in one's home, or to suggest that all parents and
courts treat caretakers in the same manner. Rather, this Article invites readers
to rethink conventional understandings of parenting and caretaking, and to fully
acknowledge the price that the current legal approach exacts-and who pays it.
I. THE "NANNY CASES"
This Part introduces two types of cases in which in-home caretaking has
been instrumental in custody and visitation decisions. First, it explores custody
decisions where the employment of in-home caretakers was credited to one
parent in awarding custody. In particular, it investigates how courts
conceptualize in-home caretaking as care by the parents rather than work by
third parties. Second, it analyzes custody and visitation decisions that required
parents to employ in-home caretakers. It examines the circumstances that
provoked judges to propose this unusual arrangement and teases out the
assumptions that these judges made about in-home paid caretaking.
A. Rewarding Parents for Employing In-Home Caretakers
The following custody cases reward a parent who has voluntarily employed
an in-home caretaker. In these cases, a parent who had been otherwise
disadvantaged-for showing poor judgment in the past, for doing little to care
for the children before the divorce, or for being unavailable due to job
requirements-was granted custody. The custody award was influenced, to
differing degrees, by the employment of a paid caretaker. A key feature of
these cases is the implicit assumption that the care that paid caretakers provide
to children can be attributed to the hiring parents.
A New York case, Forzano v. Scuderi,10 involved a typical scenario in
which parents relied on in-home care due to their extensive work obligations.
Both the attorney father and the radiologist mother worked full-time, and their
child was cared for at home by a paid caretaker. The court found that both
parents were loving and capable and that during their marriage they shared in
child care duties. Yet the court also found that, by hiring, training, and
supervising a paid caretaker, the mother performed the primary caretaking and
accordingly she was rewarded with sole custody. Moreover, "[a]warding
custody to the mother also allowed the child to continue being cared for by the
10. 637 N.Y.S.2d 767 (App. Div. 1996).
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same nanny he had known most of his life," which the judge considered to be in
the best interest of the child.' 1
This case is a remarkable example both of the prominent role a paid
caretaker may play in a child's life and of the attribution of the paid caretaker's
care to the parent. 12 Since the "primary caretaker" standard presupposes that
performing the bulk of caretaking tasks creates a bond with the child, and
therefore merits awarding custody to the caretaker, identifying who performed
the primary caretaking becomes pivotal. The court's decision to consider the
mother the "primary caretaker" because of the paid caretaker's work and her
resulting bond with the child erased the caretaker and her parental function in
this family.
I agree that supervision of a child's caretaker is a parental role. However,
since the Forzano court found that the parents had shared other aspects of
direct care, supervision alone determined custody. In part, this imbalance
attests to the disadvantages generated by the all-or-nothing approach of the
"primary caretaker" standard. 13 Yet, more is at play here. The court detached
the caretaker from the care she provided and credited that care to the mother
who supervised her. There is a difference, or rather, there can be a difference,
between considering supervision a parental role, and treating supervision as
absorbing the supervised care to the point where we would say that the
supervisor performed the care. The blurring of this distinction, I argue, is
unique to this type of child care and is one of the reasons why it is an attractive
child care solution to both courts and parents. This ideological preference,
however, comes with a cost. I demonstrate below that the attribution of in-
home caretakers' labor to parents is likely to harm both paid caretakers and
parents who cannot afford in-home caretakers. Moreover, as the following
cases demonstrate, under the prevalent "best interest of the child" standard this
attribution of care might lead courts to overestimate parental-especially
paternal--contributions to child care.
11. Id. at 769. See also Riaz v. Riaz, 789 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (awarding a neurologist
mother primary custody of her two children because the court found, inter alia, that the mother was the
primary caretaker). The Riaz finding was based in part on the fact that the mother hired a resident
caretaker who provided the children with the actual care. Anna Maria Maxwell recounts a similar case
from South Carolina, where a father was found to be the primary caretaker even though the transcript
revealed that the nanny/housekeeper "performed the largest portion of the caretaking responsibilities."
Anna Maria Maxwell, Court Extends Primary Caretaker Doctrine to Cases in Which Neither Parent
Takes Clear Responsibility for the Parental Duties, 48 S.C. L. REV. 113, 115 (1996).
12. In one adoption case, the prospective mother offered the mutual love between the child and the
in-home paid caretaker as a factor in favor of granting her petition for adoption. In re Adoption of
M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
13. The case was decided under the "best interest of the child" standard but the court employed the
primary caretaker analysis under the assumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be cared for
by the primary caretaker. It is possible that the approximation standard proposed by Elizabeth Scott and
adopted by the ALl Principles would have yielded a more nuanced result in this case, although the court
was hesitant to adopt a solution that would require the parents' cooperation due to their acrimonious
relationship. For the approximation standard, see Scott, supra note 6, at 630-43.
2008]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
In re Marriage of Austin, 14 a recent decision from Oregon awarding
custody to a father, provides a stark example of the costs to mothers of
detaching care from the caretaker and attributing it to the paying parent. After
reviewing the parties' relative benefits and disadvantages, the court awarded
custody of the children, including the mother's child from a previous
relationship, to the father. The court relied heavily on the testimony of
neighbors who "were concerned for the safety of the children in [their]
mother's care" because of the miserable condition of the children and the
shared residence during the couple's marriage. 15 The witnesses testified that the
children were not properly clothed, played outside unattended, and that "the
parties' home was dirty and food, dirty diapers, and curdled milk were often
left on the floor."' 6 The court emphasized that, after the parents had separated
and the mother moved out, "[the] father, with the help of a nanny, maintained
the home in an organized, safe, and clean condition." 17 This case seems to be a
clear example of implicit gender bias: The court did not fault the father for the
state of the children or the house during the marriage, but instead blamed it
entirely on the mother. 18 For the purpose of this Article it is important to note
that, although the father did not change his behavior at all, the work of the paid
caretaker as homemaker and child care provider made him preferable as a
custodian. 19
Another case further illustrates this point. In Shofner v. Shofner 2 0 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals approved a grant of custody to a father who
employed a caretaker even though he physically disciplined his children. The
children suffered severe behavioral problems, the most troublesome of which
was the eldest son's regular abuse of his sister-hitting her, pushing her down




18. This type of gender bias is not uncommon in custody decisions. See generally Susan Beth
Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Custody
Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 845 (1997) (reporting and analyzing an empirical study that found
gender bias in the judicial application of the "best interest of the child" standard and its criteria); Nancy
D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982) (arguing that mothers are regularly disadvantaged
in custody decisions due to the judicial double standard that penalizes mothers but not fathers for
employment and considers favorably paternal but not maternal remarriage).
19. See also Weickert v. Weickert, 602 S.E.2d 337, 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (considering the
father's use of "the services of a nanny to cook dinner, bathe the children, clean the home, and help with
homework" as an indication of his capacity to be a good single parent); Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452
N.W.2d 219, 231-32 (Minn. 1990) (weighing more heavily a father's plan to employ a live-in caretaker
"to assist him with meal preparation, housekeeping and homemaking" than to the help the father's
mother was already routinely providing); Knopp v. Knopp, No. 14-02-00285-CV, 2003 WL 21025527,
at *8 (Tex. App. May 8, 2003) (approving appointment of the father as sole managing conservator after
he testified that he worked twelve to fourteen hours a day but promised to hire an in-home caretaker,
while the mother, who had more time available to spend parenting, had only YMCA daycare as
assistance).
20. 181 S.W.3d 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
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the stairs, even breaking her arm. 2 1 The court traced the roots of this behavior
to both parents' conduct. The father, Dr. Shofner, relied on physical
22punishment and had a gambling addiction. The mother, Dr. Kalisz, was
incapable of sustaining basic social relations, and she repeatedly removed the
children from schools, activities, and their extended family. 23 The court found
that the children were "trained to be dysfunctional. 24 The court speculated that
only the parents' wealth and high social status had shielded them from
intervention by the Department of Children's Services. In the hearings, "Dr.
Shofner conceded that he had previously relied too heavily on physical
punishment and that he had been unable to care for the children on his own."26
Nonetheless, he was awarded custody of his two children because he hired an
in-home caretaker and took a parenting class.27 The court explained that, by
"actively seeking outside assistance to improve his parenting skills and to assist
him with his parenting responsibilities," Dr. Shofner had "demonstrated a
genuine desire to be a better parent.",28 For the court, these were two efforts in
the same vein. In effect, the paid caretaking reflected on Dr. Shofner in the
same way that learning new parenting skills did. The Shofner court did not ask
for, nor did it receive, any information about the paid caretaker. While dwelling
on the parents' relative disadvantages, the court mentioned neither the name,
nor the qualifications, of the caretaker who would care for the children while
Dr. Shofner practiced his new parenting skills. Like Forzano and Austin, the
Shofner court made the assumption that the care provided by an in-home
caretaker reflected positively on the parent. The court perceived parental
supervision, and even the mere fact of employment, as consuming the
caretaker's labor of care. Understanding care irrespective of the person
providing it worked in these cases to the advantage of parents who bought the
care. However, as the next subset of cases demonstrates, it sometimes proves a
double-edged sword.
B. Ordering Parents To Employ In-Home Caretakers
The judge presiding over the Littlefields' custody dispute was in a difficult
predicament. The court-appointed psychologist found "both parents to be
immature [and self-centered] and neither was well suited to take on the
21. Id. at 707.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 708.
25. Id. at 707.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 717.
28. Id. The court contrasted this effort with Dr. Kalisz's refusal to recognize her shortcomings as a
parent. The place that judges give to participation in parenting classes in their evaluations of parental
capability is beyond the scope of this Article.
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,,29
responsibility for raising a youngster .... Trusting neither parent, the judge
ordered the parents, as part of the parenting plan, to "mutually select a nanny
from a reputable firm, who will be employed for at least two years from the
date of entry of [the] parenting plan. The nanny shall travel and remain with
[the child in] each parent's household. ' 3 ° Unlike most custody decisions, the
focus of the decision was not on the attainment of cooperation between the
parents. 3 1 Rather, the judge ordered the parents to "cooperate with the nanny in
arriving at decisions regarding [the child's] well-being."
32
This order reveals a number of striking assumptions: that the paid caretaker
can mitigate parental deficiencies; that, in an erratic residential schedule,
constant care by a paid caretaker can be the means to achieve stability in a
child's life;33 and that, in the course of their work, paid caretakers make, rather
than merely execute, decisions. These assumptions are rather puzzling. The
future of the Littlefield infant was entrusted to an unknown person, who had
never been examined by the court; the only assurance of her competency was
that she came from a "reputable firm." 34 Furthermore, this anonymous
caretaker was somehow supposed to provide the child with the care the parents
could not give, despite being hired and supervised by those very same
inadequate parents. This concern may be the reason for the changes the order
introduced to ordinary employment conditions. First, the order did not leave it
to the parents to determine when the caretaker was to accompany the child.
Second, although paid in-home caretakers are generally employed "at-will"-
they can be fired for any reason or no reason at all in the absence of a public
policy, contract, or law suggesting otherwise 35-the judge's order sets the term
of employment at two years.
29. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
30. Id. at 1365 n.2. Since neither parent was found suitable to take care of the child, the parenting
plan "almost evenly split the child's residential time between the [two] parents each week." Id.
31. For the significance of parental cooperation as a factor in custody decisions in different
jurisdictions, see AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 2.08 cmt. j, at 232.
32. Littlefield, 940 P.2d at 1365 n.2. The influential, negative factors in post-divorce child
adjustment include lack of cooperation between divorcing parents; diminished parent-child contact;
disruptive life changes; and loss of economic and psychological resources. In an attempt to minimize
these problems, some states have designed divorce education programs and custody mediations aimed at
reducing parental hostility and encouraging continued parental involvement in children's lives. See
generally Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in Custody
and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 129 (2002) (describing
and analyzing the impact of numerous interventions developed to reduce the negative effect of divorce
on families).
33. Hence the court ordered the parents to employ the same paid caretaker for two years. See
Littlefield, 940 P.2d at 1365 n.2.
34. Id. The correlation between a reputable agency and qualified caretakers is not as self-evident as
the court assumes. An agency's reputation relies on its catering to parental preferences. Some parents
prefer submissive and cheap caretakers, which is unlikely to be the caretaking the Littlefield court had in
mind. See infra Section III.B.
35. See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment
of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REv. 679 (1994) (discussing the development and
adoption of the employment at-will rule in the United States).
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The notion of a decision-making, not-to-be-fired, always-with-the-child
paid caretaker is a stark departure from the constitutional doctrine that grants fit
parents a liberty interest in the nurture, custody, and control of their children.
36
At first impression it looks as if the Littlefield court, concerned with parental
inadequacy, used the custody litigation to impose a privatized version of a child
protection order on the parents, bypassing the legal finding of unfitness.
However, the court did not institute any mechanism for the caretaker to raise
concerns or report parental misconduct to the court.3 7 Rather than treating the
in-home caretaker as policing the parents, the court saw the caretaker as a
substitute-an assurance that the child would receive sufficient care. The
caretaker was seen as supplementing the parents by providing stability and by
making decisions with the child's best interest in mind. Despite this huge
responsibility, the court showed no interest in the identity of the particular
caretaker-the assumption is that the Littlefields can buy their child parental
care, detached from a parent.
When courts order parents to avail themselves of paid caretaking, what do
they assume these caretakers can do? This question merits further exploration
because, in comparison with the conventional legal perception of paid in-home
caretaking, these cases offer an extraordinary-perhaps more honest-account
of the role caretakers come to play in children's lives. In the next Part, I
demonstrate that, when courts and legal scholars consciously explore the role of
paid caretakers, they assume that there is an innate difference between a parent
and a caretaker. 38 While I suspect no judge ordering the employment of
caretakers would oppose this distinction between parents and caretakers in
theory, their orders in practice appear to challenge this distinction by treating
in-home caretakers as substitute parents.
One example of courts entrusting paid caretakers with parental
responsibilities can be seen in court orders that precondition parental visitation
with children on the presence of caretakers. Even against the backdrop of
increased reliance on supervised visitation providers in custody adjudications, 39
these decisions are unusual. Whereas supervised visitation is defined as
"contact between children and their parents or relatives with whom they do not
live that occurs in the presence of an observer with the intent of keeping the
contact safe," 40 the decisions ordering parents to employ caretakers actually
36. Note that the court did not rule the parents unfit. For parents' constitutional interest in the
raising and education of their children, see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
37. In contrast, see Taffy. Bettcher, No. FA 92-0059231, 1994 WL 411119, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 29, 1994), discussed infra notes 45-54 and within the accompanying text.
38. See infra Section lI.B.
39. Nat Stem & Karen Oehme, Defending Neutrality in Supervised Visitation To Preserve a
Crucial Family Court Service, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 37, 37-39 (2005).
40. Witness to Domestic Violence: Protecting Our Kids: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Children, Families, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 103d Cong. I 11-
17 (1994) (statement of Robert B. Straus, President, Supervised Visitation Network).
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required the caretakers to substitute for the parents, not just to supervise them.
For example, a court ordered a non-custodial father, who wanted to take his
twin boys on a three-day trip, to take the children's paid caretaker as a
precondition to approving the trip.4 1 The court cited "[t]he medical history of
the boys, their need for constant attention and supervision, and some
questionable behavior of the [father] 4 2 as the grounds for the order. The court
was very specific and ordered that the caretaker must be with the children "at
all times, including but not limited to staying with them, in the same location,
on the overnights." 43 Like the Littlefield decision, this ruling used a caretaker
not to insure that parents provide proper care, but to provide the care herself.
44
Taffy. Bettcher, a 1994 Connecticut case, went one step further.45 The Taff
decision not only forbade the mother from spending time with her child during
visitation without the presence of a paid caretaker, but also put the child's
attorney in charge of the caretaker, bypassing the parents altogether. 4' In
denying the mother's petition for custody over her three-year-old son, the court
made it abundantly clear that it considered the mother's parenting skills
severely impaired.47 The mother, Ms. Bettcher, was described as self-centered,
suffering from intellectual problems, immature, and unaware of her destructive
negativity. 48 The judge went out of his way to enumerate every one of the
mother's misdeeds, both grave and minor.49 In a remarkably stringent
comment, the court invited the child to study the records of the proceedings
with his future therapist "to discover the probable source of many of his
adulthood emotional problems."
50
Despite this indictment, the court awarded Ms. Bettcher some visitation
rights. Her son was to visit her at her residence on Wednesdays from nine to
five and on alternate weekends. However, the court conditioned these visits on
41. Magdalin v. Magdalin, No. FA99 0172340S, 2000 WL 350309, at *1-*2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 21, 2000).
42. Id. at * 1.
43. Id. at *2.
44. See also Butler v. Butler, 859 A.2d 26 (Conn. 2004). There, a trial court ordered a custodial
father, who was accused by his former wife of sexually abusing the children, to employ an in-home
caretaker even though it found the allegations to be baseless. The order read, "A nanny is to be present
at all times the children are with [the father]. The nanny shall be responsible for all grooming and
hygiene of the minor children." Id. at 31 (internal citation omitted). The appellate court interpreted the
order as shielding the father from further accusation; however, in practice, the order prohibited the father
from performing key parental tasks and entrusted them to a paid caretaker. Id. at 37-38.
45. No. FA 92-0059231, 1994 WL 411119, at *1 (Conn. Super Ct. July 29, 1994).
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *1
48. Id. at *2-*3.
49. These misdeeds include "[u]sing foul and profane language"; "[d]isrupting [her son's] toilet
training"; "not returning numerous calls from [her son's] father'; "[t]elling [her son] about court
proceedings in direct violation of court orders"; exhibiting rage regularly and having a history of drug
use; failing to give her son his medications; and leaving the "father's driveway at an excessive rate of
speed." Id. at *2.
50. Id. at *3.
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the compulsory accompaniment of a paid caretaker and firmly prohibited Ms.
Bettcher from spending time with her son without the caretaker present.5 1
Furthermore, the judge ordered the father to bypass the mother by providing the
child's medication and instructions for their administration directly to the paid
caretaker. 52 The child's attorney was charged with hiring the caretaker and
apprising the caretaker of the child's "situation and needs." 53 Unlike the
previous examples, by linking the caretaker with the child's attorney, the court
equipped her relatively well to supervise the mother. However, it is clear that
supervision was not enough. While with the mother, the child's needs were the
caretaker's responsibility; she was to substitute for the inadequate mother.
54
The cases ordering parents to employ in-home caretakers assume two
things: first, that a paid caretaker may substitute for a dysfunctional parent, and
second, that the identity of the caretaker is irrelevant and that any in-home
caretaker may provide any parental functions for any period of time. Detaching
care from the caretaker-that is, treating in-home caretakers' work as
independent of the person providing it and attributable to the hiring parents-
led in these extreme cases to the legal subjection of parents' relationships with
their children to the discretion and supervision of in-home caretakers. These
caretakers were not scrutinized by the court, nor was there any discussion of the
resulting caretaker-child relationship and its implications for the children
involved. The cases treated in-home caretaking as a band-aid, applicable when
needed and then discarded.
C. Conclusion
Case law dealing specifically with in-home caretakers is rare because
courts usually assume rather than analyze the function and benefit of this child
care solution. The few available cases are valuable for the rare glimpse they
offer into a broader phenomenon. The "nanny cases" demonstrate the pivotal
role an in-home caretaker may play in a child's life, as a complementary-and
in extreme cases substitute-parent. At the same time they eliminate this quasi-
parental figure from the legal depiction of family function by attributing the
care caretakers provide to the parent who hired them.
It is tempting to explain these custody and visitation cases from the narrow
doctrinal perspective of custody law-that is, to either say that children need
adult care and courts are trying to provide it by all means available or that
51. Id.
52. Id. at *4.
53. Id. at *3.
54. Compare Taffwith Wissner v. Wissner, No. FA 040491308S, 2005 WL 704304, at *1, *7
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2005), a case where the court conditioned a mother's visitation on the
presence of a court-appointed family member whose job was to supervise the mother "at all times," not
to care for the child.
2008]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
custody judges' task is to choose between parents and so they should consider
caretaking arrangements only as they reflect on the parents themselves. In the
following Parts, I argue that there is more at play. The "nanny cases" provide
an opportunity to ask what necessitates detaching the care from the caretaker
and what underlying assumptions inform the process of allocating custodial
responsibility. Conceptualizing in-home caretaking as care without a caretaker
rests on a set of assumptions about parents and parental functions, none of
which can be sufficiently explained by children's need for stable care. In fact, a
closer look at these assumptions reveals flawed logic and unjust consequences.
II. EXCLUSIVE FAMILY AND CHILD CARE
The legal consequences of performing caretaking tasks are the subject of
heated debate. Some courts and legislatures have tried to change legal
definitions to better reflect contemporary family life and caretaking
arrangements. The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution [hereinafter ALI Principles] from 2000 is a key contributor to this
trend. Among other things, the ALI Principles define "parent" for the purpose
of custody and "decisionmaking responsibility" as including "parents by
estoppel," thus treating as parents adults who function as parents in specific
circumstances. 55 Other legal texts do not challenge the traditional definition of
"parent," but instead try to strike a new balance between parents and non-
parents, for example by awarding visitation rights to non-parents.56 These
developments have been widely challenged,57 and even where the definition of
"parent" has been expanded to include non-biological or adoptive parents, it is
still the law that at any given time a child can have only two legal parents.
58
55. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 2.03(1). The ALI Principles list four types of individuals who
may be parents by estoppel: individuals imposed with child support obligations; a man who lived with a
child for at least two years and had a reason to believe that he is the child's biological father; an
individual who lived with a child since birth under a co-parenting agreement with the legal parent or
parents; and finally an individual who lived with the child for over two years following an agreement
with the child's parent. Id. § 2.03(l)(b). Note that the ALI Principles uses the term "de facto parent" to
denote a person who functioned as a child's "primary parent" for not less than two years, but does not
meet the heightened requirements of the "parent by estoppel" standard. Id. § 2.03(l)(c). Under the
Principles, such de facto parents should be allocated a share in custodial responsibility but they do not
enjoy the presumptions that legal parents and parents by estoppel enjoy. Id. at 13.
56. According to the Supreme Court, at the time of its decision in Troxel v. Granville, every state
provided grandparents (and sometimes great-grandparents) with some form of visitation rights. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 n.l (2000) (holding unconstitutional a Washington statute providing that a
court may award visitation to any person at any time when visitation is in the best interest of the
children). However, some states have subsequently restricted those rights in reaction to Troxel. See, e.g.,
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1502 (West) (amending CAL. FAM. CODE. § 3104 (West 1994)); G.P. v. A.A.K.,
841 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (recognizing ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.1 (1989) as
unconstitutional in certain circumstances); In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 319 (Colo. 2006)
(limiting on constitutional grounds COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (1999)); Wickham v. Byrne, 769
N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002) (holding 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1), (3) (2000) unconstitutional).
57. See infra Section II.A.
58. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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In this Part, I argue that the conceptualization of paid in-home caretaking
as care by parents should be understood in the context of this debate. Detaching
care from caretakers helps bridge the growing gap between the two-parent
model of family life and the reality of many American families by maintaining
the appearance that caretaking is performed solely by parents. To develop this
argument, I describe the legal debate over access to children and the parental
exclusivity doctrine and analyze the conceptualization of in-home caretaking in
light of this legal regulation. I then contrast the legal treatment of in-home
caretaking with that of other child care arrangements. My aim in making this
comparison is to expose the substantial practical implications that result from
the assumptions that judges make about different types of caretaking, which, I
argue, can cause unjust discrimination against parents who cannot afford in-
home caretaking.
A. Exclusive Family Doctrine
Faced with reproductive technology, changing gender roles, and increasing
diversity in the family unit, courts and policy makers in the United States have
remained faithful to the dominant doctrine of parental exclusivity. This doctrine
"recognizes only one set of parents for a child at any one time" 59 and vests in
these parents exclusive rights that non-parents cannot acquire. Regardless of
the number of actual caretakers a child may have, for legal purposes the
prevalent rule is that only two people-usually one man and one woman-can
be designated as the child's legal parents.6 1 The possibility that a child might
have more than two parents has been rejected repeatedly by courts, including
the Supreme Court.
62
59. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 879.
60. Id. at 883.
61. Thus the California Supreme Court, in finding a woman obligated to pay child support to her
former lesbian partner for children bom during the partnership, emphasized that its ruling should be
construed as to allow only that the two parents of a child can be of the same sex. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct.,
117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005). The Court repeated its former rejection of a woman's motherhood claim
in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), as a ruling that a child cannot have three parents. Id.
See also Sinicropi v. Mazurek, 729 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that a child cannot have,
simultaneously, two legally recognized fathers under the Paternity Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.711-
.730 (2006), and the Acknowledgement of Parenthood Act, MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 722.1001-.1013
(2006)).
62. In the words of Justice Scalia, "multiple fatherhood has no support in the history and traditions
of this country." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989). A similar approach was manifested
in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (subordinating non-parental visitation rights to parental
discretion). Even in the case of open adoption, the parental rights of biological parents are terminated
and any rights they might have are contractual. Amy L. Doherty, A Look at Open Adoption, II J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 591, 592 (2000). For a discussion of the systematic preference of the nuclear
family in American constitutional law, see generally Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy:
Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform,
66 Mo. L. REV. 527 (2001), which surveys landmark cases promoting both family privacy policy and
personal autonomy and locates in both a concern for the preservation of the traditional nuclear family.
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Parental exclusivity is strongly linked to the notion that caretaking is a
matter for the nuclear family. 63 It assumes that childrearing is performed
mainly by two heterosexual biological or adoptive parents.64 Parents are legally
obligated to provide their children with care and nurturing and in return they
are rewarded with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in control over
their children. 65 The Supreme Court described this tradeoff over seventy-five
years ago in referring to parents' right to educate their children: "Those who
nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
66
While the doctrine of parental exclusivity has always been informed by a
class- and race-biased conception of family structure,67 recent social trends
have placed this conception of the family at odds with the experience of an
ever-growing number of families. Technological advancements in childbearing
have brought surrogate mothers and sperm and egg donors to court seeking
parental rights. The high rate of divorce, the rise in the number of cohabitating
unmarried parents, and the increase in single-parent households has brought
petitions for legal parental status from stepparents and unwed fathers.
68
Growing social recognition of the role grandparents and gay partners play in
children's lives has come with a demand for access and sometimes also
63. Martha Fineman has forcefully criticized the allocation of the responsibility for dependents to
the nuclear family. She argues instead for collective responsibility for caretaking based on dependency's
inevitability and universality because all people were dependent as children and many will become
dependents again due to sickness or old age. Fineman emphasizes the unjust consequences current
policy entails for women, especially poor women. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (1999);
Martha L.A. Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 89 (1998); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81
VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995). In addition, other scholars have argued that the nuclear family's viability as
the primary locus of caretaking relied heavily on economic and political support systems that are
unavailable today. The prototypical nuclear family, "the 1950s suburban family[,] ... was far more
dependent on government handouts than any so-called 'underclass' in recent U.S. history." STEPHANIE
COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 76 (2000).
64. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 468-69
(1990).
65. Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare, II WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1071, 1078-79 (2003) (arguing that the "legal deference" to parental autonomy in the context of the
intact family serves as compensation for parenting and its obligations and that parental autonomy
promotes children's welfare by encouraging parental investment in the parent-child relationship).
66. Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)). For a critical account of the historical roots of this doctrine, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Who Owns the Child? Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995
(1992).
67. See Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 539, 543 (1984) (highlighting the longstanding tradition among some minority groups in the
United States of shared child caretaking within extended kin networks).
68. According to Matthew Kavanagh, "demographers estimate that less than 50 percent of
American children will spend their entire childhood in a two-parent, married couple biological family."
Matthew Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 114 (2004).
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decision-making authority. In short, the doctrine of parental exclusivity has
been subject to a constant, and at times successful, challenge to its basic
premises about who can be a parent and what parenting consists of. The
challengers claim that, by performing the daily tasks of caretaking over a
period of time, they have established a relationship with the child that should,
at least to a certain extent, be legally protected. These claims have been
successful to varying degrees depending on the state, the nature of the past and
present relations between the claimant and the parent, and the claimant's
relationship with the child.6 9
Custody cases, where judges assess parents' caretaking arrangements and
abilities, offer another, more subtle, challenge to the doctrine of parental
exclusivity. Many custody decisions reveal family life practices that vary
considerably from the ideal nuclear family on which parental exclusivity
doctrine is based.70 Acting within a legal regime that assigns the responsibility
of caretaking to the nuclear family, judges struggle with parents' personal
deficiencies, available resources, and work obligations when devising
caretaking arrangements that are in the best interest of children.
The diversity in family structures and the growing social acceptability of
formerly discouraged or prohibited types of family units have changed legal
conceptions of who can be recognized as a legal parent. However, despite the
extension of parental rights to other adults-as qualified as those rights may be
in substance-the rights holders are always limited in number: No more than
two parents are recognized.7'
69. See, e.g., Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing grandparents'
claim of de facto parenthood). But see Jensen v. Bevard, 168 P.3d 1209 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (revoking
grandmother's sole custody because she did not establish a parent-child relationship with the child). The
results of gay partners' claims are similarly mixed. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 910 A.2d 1145 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (finding a woman to be the de facto parent of a child adopted by her former partner
and raised by the couple as co-parents and granting her visitation rights but not custody); E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (granting a former lesbian partner's petition for visitation); In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (finding that a former lesbian partner established standing
as a de facto parent and could bring a petition for a co-parentage determination). But see Alison D. v.
Virginia M. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the former lesbian partner of the biological mother
had no standing to seek visitation rights with the child she helped support and raise); Titchenal v.
Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (denying a woman's petition to be considered a de facto parent of her
former partner's adopted child, even though, until the parties' separation, the petitioner cared for the
child sixty-five percent of the time).
70. According to Troxel, the variation in family and household composition is so wide that it is
difficult to speak of "an average American family." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
Historians have convincingly argued that the emphasis on the nuclear family is a relatively recent
phenomenon. See COONTZ, supra note 63. In Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988), in
determining that a visitation agreement between the genetic mother and the adoptive parents did not
violate public policy, the court acknowledged that "various configurations of parents, stepparents,
adoptive parents and grandparents" have replaced the narrow model of the nuclear family. Id. at 742.
71. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions between Legal, Biological, and
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 133-34 (2006) (asserting that even courts
who permit non-parents to seek custody or visitation based on caretaking fall short of awarding such
caretakers the status of legal parents). In contrast, the ALl Principles suggest that in certain
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B. Paid In-Home Caretakers and the Exclusive Family
In the context of the parental exclusivity doctrine's restriction on the
number of people who can acquire legal parental status, paid in-home
caretaking is advantageous for more than its supposed benefit to children's
development. 72 Paradoxically, reliance on non-relative paid care in situations of
family disruption allows courts to reinforce the model of an exclusive nuclear
family of mother, father, and children, and to protect it from what is perceived
as external intrusion. Courts that continue to adopt the approach taken by the
"nanny cases" will, in effect, encourage and applaud parental reliance on paid
caretakers, who lose, as we shall see below, any legal claim that might infringe
on parental autonomy the minute the first dollar changes hands.
This approach ignores the fact that some paid caretakers are intimately
familiar with their charges' needs and have become stable parent-like figures,
and that some caretakers develop strong attachments to the children in their
care. 73 Moreover, in-home caretakers are, at least partially, paid to develop
such attachments. 74 Where non-paid caretakers, like grandparents, might look
for legal recourse to sustain such attachments,75 paid caretakers are excluded
from challenging parental authority and control over their children and
therefore pose no threat. Paid in-home caretaking therefore allows parents in
dual-career households to have their cake and eat it, too-to have one adult
parental figure providing child-focused care over time in accordance with the
current ideology of childrearing, without the risk of compromising the parents'
control over the child.76 It also allows the legal system to avoid acknowledging
the discrepancies in its proclaimed exclusive family doctrine.
The distinction between parents and paid in-home caretakers goes beyond
the fact of payment. Courts, parents, and scholars seem to share a belief that
paid caretakers are inherently different from parents. On the rare occasions that
courts consciously characterize paid caretakers' performance, they are quick to
circumstances an adult ought to be recognized as a parent by estoppel even when a child has two legal
parents. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 2.03(l)(b)(iii)-(iv).
72. See infra Section IIB.
73. PIERRETTE HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, DOMtSTICA: IMMIGRANT WORKERS CLEANING AND CARING
IN THE SHADOWS OF AFFLUENCE 39, 42-43, 123, 152 (2001); Arlie Russell Hochschild, Love and Gold,
in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 15, 24 (Barbara
Ehrenreich & Arlie Russel Hochschild eds., 2002); Patricia Baquedano-L6pez, A Stop at the End of the
Bus Line: Nannies, Children, and the Language of Care 14 (Berkeley Ctr. for Working Families,
Working Paper No. 51, 2002).
74. MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A.: 10TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 137 (2002); Susan
Cheever, The Nanny Dilemma, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra note 73, at 31, 35; Hochschild, supra note 73,
at 23; Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Blowups and Other Unhappy Endings, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra
note 73, at 55, 68; Romero, supra note 2, at 835.
75. See infra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
76. This appearance of parental care where direct care is performed by paid caretakers is facilitated
by a childrearing ideology that overvalues intellectually-enhancing childrearing tasks and undervalues
menial care. See infra Part Ill. As the following analysis reveals, other types of child care, like kin care
and day care, do not enjoy similar treatment.
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rule that the functions paid caretakers fulfill do not resemble parental duties.
Judges tend to see "a world of difference" between parents and in-home
caretakers. 77 Even family law scholars who challenge parental exclusivity share
this view. Although they propose a care-based standard for legally sanctioned
child-adult relationships, they dismiss the possibility of any acknowledgement
of paid caretakers' parental role. 78 Similarly, under the ALl Principles, in order
to qualify as a "de facto parent," an individual must have performed child care
tasks "for reasons primarily other than financial compensation., 79 The
Principles explain their absolute exclusion of paid caretakers by invoking the
different assumptions the law makes about parents and paid caretakers:
The law grants parents responsibility for their children based, in part,
on the assumption that they are motivated by love and loyalty, and thus
are likely to act in the child's best interests. The same motivation
cannot be assumed on the part of adults who have provided caretaking
functions primarily for financial reasons. o
This is an unsatisfactory explanation. It fails to clarify why the inability to
make an a priori assumption about paid caretakers' motivations should lead to a
blanket prohibition of parental rights. Child custody is determined on a case-
by-case analysis, and there is no reason to believe that courts that regularly
scrutinize parental motivation will be unable to determine whether the actions
of a specific paid caretaker were motivated, in part, by love and loyalty.
Furthermore, the ALI Principles, in its narrow "best interest of the child"
analysis, ignores the possibility that some children might develop strong
attachments to their paid caretakers and suffer from complete separation from
them. 81 The ALI Principles' refusal to allow a case-by-case analysis is
testimony to the institutional, ideological, and legal power of the distinction
between paid caretakers and parents.
82
In certain respects this view is well-founded. Parents are under obligations
to support their children and to provide for their medical, emotional,
educational, and physical needs. They are called upon to make tough decisions
and sacrifices, and, other than the clear legal path of relinquishing their parental
rights, they have no legal way of shedding these responsibilities. Paid
77. Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Mass. 1999).
78. E.g., Bartlett, supra note 7, at 947 (designing the criteria for adult-child relationships that
warrant state protection in a way that excludes paid caretakers, based on the assumption that the
supervision by parents makes these relationships non-parental in the eyes of the child); Kavanagh, supra
note 68, at 128 (discussing Bartlett's criteria and adding a requirement of mutuality so that "paid
caretakers and other self-interested parties would not warrant legal recognition").
79. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 2.03(l)(c)(ii).
80. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c(ii), at 120.
81. Cheever, supra note 74, at 35. Because caretakers know that children's attachment may arouse
parental jealousy and cost them their jobs, they may try to limit demonstrations of affection in the
parents' presence. HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 151; see also WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 79-
80.
82. It may also reflect a wish to avoid the vehement opposition that awarding caretakers parental
privileges might generate.
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caretakers are employed at-will and can leave their workplace (and the child in
their charge) whenever they wish to do so. Parents receive much emotional
satisfaction as well as a number of financial benefits, such as tax breaks, for
having children. 83 Paid caretakers receive a salary that is supposed to
remunerate them for all of the childrearing tasks that they perform. Even when
a parent is aided by someone else in child care, the ultimate responsibility for
the child's well-being rests with the parent.84 In the words of a Florida judge,
"There are certain things that money cannot buy and that a nanny cannot
provide, such as the attention of caring parents."
85
However, closer scrutiny of the actual tasks paid caretakers perform blurs
the distinctions between the roles of parent and paid caretaker. While the
employer parents retain the overall responsibility for the child, they frequently
delegate many of the daily tasks of direct care to paid caretakers, including
grooming, feeding, supervising, assisting with homework, and attending to a
waking child at night. Consider this in-home caretaker's schedule:
[T]he nanny was required to be at Father's [a doctor] house at 6:00
a.m. During the school year, she helped the children get ready for
school and dropped them off at school. After school, she picked the
children up, brought them home to Father's house and got them started
on their homework. In the summer, the nanny stayed with the children
from the time Father left in the morning to the time he returned in the
evenings. When Father was on call while the children were staying
with him, the nanny would spend the night at Father's house.
86
This is by no means an exceptional account. The duties of paid caretakers
are far broader than those for which courts and scholars give them credit. As
this description demonstrates, paid caretakers regularly perform the more
intensive and less pleasurable duties of parenting. 87 Often it is up to the paid
caretaker to notice what is going on in the child's life, having spent so many
hours attuned to the child and her needs. This fact becomes apparent in courts
when in-home caretakers are treated as important witnesses to the
83. The largest government child care program is the child and dependent care tax credit. Barry L.
Friedman & Martin Rein, The Evolution of Family Policy in the United States after World War I1, in
CROSS CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 101, 107 (Sanford
N. Katz et al. eds., 2000).
84. However, consider Joy Zarembka's account of Tigris Bekele, a live-in caretaker who was
charged with neglect when the children were found unattended, even though she was off-duty at the
time. On the morning that Bekele fled the home of her employers after having suffered severe
exploitation, the children were released from school due to a bomb scare. Although the children arrived
at the empty house at 10:00 a.m., when Bekele was off-duty as a caretaker, she was arrested for leaving
the children unattended. Joy M. Zarembka, America's Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day
Slavery, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra note 73, at 142, 148.
85. Young v. Hector, 740 So.2d 1153, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
86. Styka v. Styka, 972 P.2d 16, 23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
87. Romero, supra note 2, at 835.
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circumstances of children's everyday life, such as when there is a suspicion of
abuse.
88
A comparison between the tasks that are commonly delegated to paid
caretakers and the indicia courts employ to determine which parent is the
"primary caretaker" is illuminating. Under the "primary caretaker" standard
used in custody determinations in a number of states,89 the parent who provides
daily care is assumed to have developed a stronger relationship with the child
that should be protected in a divorce. 90 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals listed the tasks of care that constitute custody-worthy parental
behavior:
(1) preparing and planning meals; (2) bathing, grooming, and dressing;
(3) purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care,
including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social
interaction with peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends'
houses...; (6) arranging alternative care...; (7) putting child to bed
at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in
the morning; (8) disciplining i.e. teaching general manners and toilet
training; (9) educating i.e. religious, cultural, social etc.; and (10)
teaching the child elementary skills, i.e. reading, writing and
arithmetic.
9 1
The ALI Principles also describe several tasks as "caretaking functions,"
which involve "the direct delivery of day-to-day care and supervision to the
child. 92 These include "physical supervision, feeding, grooming, discipline,
transportation, direction of the child's intellectual and emotional development,
and arrangement of the child's peer activities, medical care and education."
93
88. See, e.g., R.J.M. v. Alaska, 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999); Doe v. Doe, 44 P.3d 1085 (Haw. 1994);
Dieterle v. Dieterle, 960 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Vernon v. Vernon. 800 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y.
2003); L.M.W. v. Texas, 891 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Fairfax County v. Neidig, No. 1304-97-
4, 1998 WL 144375 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1998).
89. For recent cases that consider which parent acted as the primary caretaker as a factor in custody
determinations, see, for example, In re Marriage of Heath, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 760, 763 (Ct. App. 2004);
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 476-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Messer v. Messer, 850 So. 2d
161, 166 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); DesLauriers v. DesLauriers, 642 N.W.2d 892, 896 (N.D. 2002); and
Patel v. Patel, 599 S.E.2d 114, 120 (S.C. 2004). See also Paul L. Smith, The Primary Caretaker
Presumption: Have We Been Presuming Too Much?, 75 IND. L.J. 731 (2000) (surveying the
implementation of the "primary caretaker" standard and its implications).
90. The standard corresponds to the psychological parent standard proposed by Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). See Kathryn L.
Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making: How Judges Use the Primary Caretaker
Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5-6 (1998).
91. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). West Virginia is the only state in which there
is a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker.
92. AM. LAW INST., supra note 6, § 2.03 cmt. g, at 125.
93. Id. Section 2.03(5) of the ALI Principles reads:
Caretaking Functions are tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct, arrange,
and supervise the interaction and care provided by others. Caretaking functions include but
are not limited to all of the following:
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the child's bedtime and wake-
up routines, caring for the child when sick or injured, being attentive to the child's
personal hygiene needs including washing, grooming, and dressing, playing with the
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The Principles promote an award of custodial responsibility according to past
performance of these caretaking functions, and not based on other "parenting
functions," like financial support, participation in decision-making regarding
the child's welfare, or household chores like laundry, yard work, and car
repairs. 94 The Principles explain the importance of caretaking functions to
custody determinations:
The allocation of custodial responsibility ... assumes that the division
of past caretaking functions correlates well with other factors
associated with the child's best interests, such as the quality of each
parent's emotional attachment to the child and the parents' respective
parenting abilities.
95
As mentioned above, the ALI Principles' perception that the performance
of caretaking functions over a substantial period of time creates a relationship
between children and adults that merits legal protection has led to their
recognition of de facto parents. The Principles restrict this status to adults who
have lived with the child and have regularly performed a considerable portion
of caretaking functions. A similar belief in the intrinsic quality of caretaking
activities was recently expressed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:
IT]he parent-child bond grows from the myriad hands-on activities of
an adult in tending to a child's needs. Unlike other parenting
activities.., which benefit the child but are not performed directly for
him or, usually, in his presence-caretaking tasks 'are likely to have a
special bearing on the strength and quality of the adult's relationship
with the child.'
96
In families that hire in-home caretakers, many of these parental chores are
routinely performed by employees. In fact, studies show that hiring parents-
child and arranging for recreation, protecting the child's physical safety, and providing
transportation;
(b) directing the child's various developmental needs, including the acquisition of
motor and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence, and maturation;
(c) providing discipline, giving instructions in manners, assigning and supervising
chores, and performing other tasks that attend to the child's needs for behavioral
control and self-restraint;
(d) arranging for the child's education,.. communicating with teachers and counselors,
and supervising homework;
(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal relationships
with peers, siblings, and other family members;
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up and home health care;
(g) providing moral and ethical guidance;
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter, or other child-care
provider or facility, including investigation of alternatives, communication with
providers, and supervision of care.
Id. § 2.03(5).
94. Id. § 2.03(6).
95. Id. ch. 2 cmt. b, at 182. The Principles add that basing custodial responsibility on performance
of caretaking functions promotes the "greatest degree of stability in the child's life ... especially [in) the
child's relationships with the primary caretaker." Id.
96. A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1071 (Mass. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting AM. LAW INST.,
supra note 6, § 2.03 cmt. g).
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usually mothers 97-expect their paid caretakers to operate as a "shadow
mother," to perform caretaking tasks with maternal warmth and affection, but
then to vanish from sight once the mother is back home.98 However, if
performing hands-on caretaking functions creates the bonds of attachment that
the ALI Principles and the courts assume it does, then this vanishing act is just
that-an act. It is easy to understand why parents would want to think
otherwise, and to some extent, it is likely that judges and the ALI Principles'
authors share the values and worldview of professional parents. But the legal
adoption of this approach does more than reassure working parents of their
importance in their children's lives. The legal category "nanny"-that is,
someone who performs parental tasks but by definition cannot be considered a
parent-fits well in the broad parental exclusivity doctrine. It makes families
that do not function as the doctrine presumes appear as if they did.
The work done by this conceptualization of paid caretakers is apparent in
Amy G. v. M W.99 In that case, a trial court compared a woman who raised her
husband's son almost from birth to a paid in-home caretaker when denying her
petition to be considered the child's mother. The husband fathered the child in
an extramarital affair and the child's biological mother, Kim, surrendered him a
month after his birth to be raised by the father and his wife, Amy. Both Kim
and Amy petitioned the court to be acknowledged as the child's mother, and,
because California abides by the parental exclusivity doctrine and the child's
father was known and present in the action, the trial court had to decide
between the two women.' Although the child had been in Amy's care for over
two years, "[t]he trial court repeatedly asked 'how is Amy ... any different
from a live-in nanny?' and "also commented, '[Amy] doesn't have custody
rights. [Father] has custody rights. And she happens to live with [father].' 10 1
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's rejection of Amy's claim, 102 but
admonished the lower court for comparing Amy to a "nanny," describing the
comparison as "unfortunate."'
0 3
97. Mothers provide most of the daily supervision of caretakers. See WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 85.
98. Cameron Lynne Macdonald, Shadow Mothers: Nannies, Au Pairs, and Invisible Work, in
WORKING IN THE SERVICE SOCIETY 244, 250 (Cameron Lynne Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni eds.,
1996); Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 58 (1997).
99. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Ct. App. 2006).
100. In the words of the appellate court, "Here, Nathan's natural father is known and present in the
action. Nathan only can have one additional parent." Id. at 305. See also Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d
660, 666 (Cal. 2005); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
101. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 301 (alteration in original).
102. The trial court granted the mother's motion to quash Amy's independent action to establish a
parental relationship with the child and rejected the father's petition to add Amy as a necessary party to
the mother's custody petition.
103. Amy G., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 301 n.4. Interestingly, when commenting on this comparison, the
appellate court used the term "domestic employee" and not "live-in nanny," as to emphasize the
employment aspect, which was, apparently, the reason the appellate court found the comparison
insulting.
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Where the appellate court saw an insult, I see the irreconcilable gap
between the dogmatic imperative to limit parenthood to two parents per child
and the intricate family reality in which more than two adults may parent a
child. The trial court's comparison settles the tension by displacing it: If the
stepmother taking care of the child can be redefined as the equivalent of a paid
in-home caretaker, her assertion that she has a parental role can then be more
easily dismissed. The appellate court was uncomfortable with the trial court's
classification of Amy as a paid in-home caretaker. However, both courts
participated in the dismissal of parental bonds between paid caretakers and
children. We should seize upon the appellate court's discomfort to ask whether
the trial court really got the comparison wrong, or whether some in-home
caretakers play parental roles in children's lives like the stepmother did in this
case.
The trial court protected parental exclusivity by characterizing the
stepmother as the type of caretaker who is absolutely excluded from competing
with parents over control or access to the child. When the trial court compared
the stepmother to a paid caretaker it made the same assumption that the "nanny
cases" have made-namely that the care of the "nanny" (in this case the
stepmother) can be attributed to the child's parent. Despite the fact that Amy
claimed that she raised the child, and although the court-appointed expert
referred to Amy's bond with the child in his report, the trial court referred to
Amy as someone who "happens to live" with the child's father, thus attributing
her caretaking to the custodial father.'0 4 It is telling that the trial court refused
to take judicial notice of the expert's evaluation-it even announced that it had
not read the report. ° 5 This willful ignorance allowed the court both to erase
Amy's role in raising the child and to pretend that the father did so on his own
in the same way that courts usually ignore paid caretakers' role in childrearing.
Amy's classification as "no different from a nanny" was complete.
C. In-Home Caretaking as the Foil to Other Types of Child Care
Arrangements
The "nanny cases" expose a substantive class bias in the way courts uphold
a specific version of good parenting-intensive child-focused childrearing-
which is attainable only by the wealthy few. Other child care arrangements are
less likely to be so favorably attributed to parents. In what follows, I offer a
glimpse at judicial attitudes toward other child care arrangements, mainly day
care and kin care. My aim is not to present an exhaustive account of the
104. Id. at 301.
105. Id. The appellate court did review the report, "which discusses, inter alia, the bond between




divergent treatment that different types of care arrangements receive from the
legal system. Rather, my goal is to provide a context for the conceptualization
of paid in-home care. I suggest that other types of child care might be treated
differently because they do not lend themselves as neatly to the same
conceptual assumptions that courts make about paid in-home caretaking: that
while the work in-home caretakers do can be attributed to the hiring parent, it is
very different from parenting. I argue that day care centers do not invoke the
attribution of the care to the parent, and therefore are incompatible with the
dominant cultural perception of good parenting as providing close adult
attention to and supervision of organized tasks to enhance children's
intellectual development. 10 6 Meanwhile, kin care blurs the distinction between
parent and caretaker and as a result is problematic from the point of view of the
exclusive family.
1. Day Care
American middle-class parents are often prejudiced against day care
centers. 107 This is partly due to the fact that relatively little high quality day
care is available in the United States. 108 However, the anxiety about child care
was fed by a largely exaggerated negative media campaign in the 1980s
regarding sex abuse and other dangers.'0 9 Still, in 2002, 22.7% of working
mothers' children under five were cared for by an organized care facility. 110
Children of working mothers attending day care centers spent an average of
106. For more on this childrearing ideology, see infra Section lIl.A.
107. HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 4-5; Denise Urias Levy & Sonya Michel, More Can
Be Less: Child Care and Welfare Reform in the United States, in CHILD CARE POLICY AT THE
CROSSROADS: GENDER AND WELFARE STATE RESTRUCTURING 239, 241 (Sonya Michel & Rianne
Mahon eds., 2002) (contending that this bias could be detected as early as the 1930s, when nursery
schools became "the darlings of the middle class," whereas day care centers and day nurseries "gained a
reputation for being 'custodial warehouses' that only the poor would use"). Mary Eberstadt voices much
of the prevalent anxiety by calling day care centers germ factories and blaming them for children's
aggressiveness. See MARY EBERSTADT, HOME-ALONE AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF DAY CARE,
BEHAVIORAL DRUGS, AND OTHER PARENT SUBSTITUTES 4-12 (2004).
108. Scholars have declared a child care crisis that manifests itself in problems of affordability,
supply, and quality. See SUZANNE W. HELBURN & BARBARA R. BERGMANN, AMERICA'S CHILD CARE
PROBLEM: THE WAY OUT 39-44 (2002) (calling for governmental and employer contributions in order
to provide affordable quality child care).
109. While day care centers received little coverage during the 1970s and early 1980s, by 1984 the
media were flooded with news stories about the dangers of day care centers, especially child abuse.
Most of these stories proved false, sometimes after the accused suffered public shame and even spent
time in jail. SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION
OF MOTHERHOOD AND How IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN 90, 95-103 (2005). Parents continue to
recoil from day care even though research continually shows that children are far more likely to be
abused at home than at a day care. See SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN 42-43 (1991).
110. Johnson, supra note 3, at 2 tbl.1.
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thirty-four hours per week there, and children at nurseries and preschools spent
twenty-two hours per week at these facilities. 
111
In the common setting of two-earner families, day care is generally
considered to be. an appropriate solution for child care. 112 When a Michigan
judge said otherwise in 1994, and refused to award custody to a student mother
because she put her daughter in day care, his decision attracted attention on a
national scale.l13 The judgment was overturned by the appellate court, 114 and
the Supreme Court of Michigan clarified that "day care generally is an entirely
appropriate manner of balancing [parental] obligations" with work and
schooling. 1 15 Still, some parents are penalized for using day care, because
courts tend to emphasize that the hours spent in day care are hours not spent
with the parent. 
116
A comparison highlights the difference in conceptual assumptions
regarding day care and in-home paid care. Recall that the judge in Forzano v.
Scuderi found Ms. Scuderi to be her child's primary caretaker despite the fact
that, during the marriage, both parents shared in child care duties. The reason
the court gave for its finding was that Ms. Scuderi "hired, trained, and
supervised" the in-home caretaker. 117 Compare the Forzano case to Johnson v.
Lewis, a 2005 case that denied a mother's appeal of an order directing physical
custody of her son to be shared equally by the divorced parents. 118 Both parties
in Johnson characterized the mother, Ms. Johnson, as the primary caretaker and
the initial temporary custody order established her as the child's primary
physical custodian.' 19 However, Ms. Johnson was eventually denied the
benefits of primary caretaker status because she put the child in a day care
center. 120 The court found that "[the child] has spent at least eight hours of each
weekday in secondary child care. Therefore, [the] mother's status as primary
11. Id. at 7 fig.2.
112. Recently the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in a footnote that "[d]ay care is a
fact of life in such circumstances and ought not be used as the measure of a parent's ability or
commitment to provide a protective, healthy, and positive environment for the child." In re Custody of
Kali, 792 N.E.2d 635, 644 n.12 (Mass. 2003).
113. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 845 & n. I. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the
decision generated sixty-one amici curiae briefs, all in support of the mother. Ireland v. Smith, 547
N.W.2d 686, 691 (Mich. 1996).
114. Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
115. 547N.W.2dat691.
116. Schaaf v. Schaaf, No. 224182, 2000 WL 33403306 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2000) (per
curiam) (granting father's petition to modify custody, partly because mother worked two jobs and relied
heavily on day care which did not leave the child enough "quality time" with the mother).
117. Forzano v. Scuderi, 637 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (App. Div. 1996).
118. Johnson v. Lewis, 870 A.2d 368, 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
119. Id. at370-71.
120. Id. at 373 n.7. The court also noted that for a month before utilizing a day care center the
parents relied on an out-of-home child care arrangement, in the form of a babysitter in whose home the
child spent several hours every day. Id. at 370.
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caretaker and custodian, while still warranting positive consideration, was
entitled to less weight."
' 12
'
The focus of this discussion is not the relative merits of the care provided
by a paid in-home caretaker versus that provided by a day care center. Ms.
Johnson did not lose her primary caretaker status because the day care was
found unsatisfactory, and Ms. Scuderi did not gain primary caretaker status
simply because the in-home caretaker she employed provided high quality care.
Rather, the courts made different assumptions about the time the child had not
been in these mothers' direct care. Ms. Johnson suffered from the fact that the
time the child spent in a day care center was counted as time in which she did
not care for the child. Ms. Scuderi, in contrast, was fully credited for the time
the child spent with the in-home caretaker, whom she hired, trained, and
supervised. The absence of Ms. Scuderi, a full-time radiologist, from the work
the caretaker was performing within her home was similar to Ms. Johnson's
absence from the child care center, and both women paid for someone else to




Approximately one-third of parents in dual-earner households turn to their
own parents for help with child care. According to the Census Bureau, in the
winter of 2002, about one-third of employed mothers' children under the age of
two were cared for by grandparents. I2 In total, 28.3% of employed mothers'
children under the age of five spent an average of twenty-four hours a week in
their grandparents' care. 124 Another 11% of these children were cared for by
relatives other than grandparents.12 5 These data reflect the fact that middle-class
working mothers have joined generations of minority families, especially
economically disadvantaged ones, for whom the solution to child care problems
has long been to turn to their kin for help.
126
121. Id. at 373 n.7.
122. The sharp difference in judicial treatment of in-home paid care and day care centers also
clarifies that it is not the payment that informs judicial regard for paid in-home caretaking. The fact that
care is paid for is not considered in itself an indication that it is better than other forms of care.
123. Specifically, 33.7% of children under the age of one and 30% of children between the ages
one and two were cared for by grandparents. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.2.
124. Id. at 4 tbl.2, 7 fig.2.
125. Id. at4tbl.2.
126. See GRACE CHANG, DISPOSABLE DOMESTICS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 78 (2000) (linking the prevalence of kin care and community care among communities of
color to the fact that historically many women of color had to work, even while raising young children,
due to the inadequate income of male family members or the absence thereof); Catherine Chase
Goodman & Merril Silverstein, Latina Grandmothers Raising Grandchildren: Acculturation and
Psychological Well-Being, in CUSTODIAL GRANDPARENTING: INDIVIDUAL, CULTURAL, AND ETHNIC
DIVERSITY 237, 237-40 (Bert Hayslip Jr. & Julie Hicks Patrick eds., 2006) (noting that, among Latino
groups, caretaking is more likely to be a cooperative effort and often grandparents and their adult
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Kin care is often regarded as quality care, and children's relationships with
their extended family are sometimes a factor in courts' custody determinations
weighing in favor of one parent or the other.' 27 However, when a parent's
extended family members perform a considerable share of the child care, that
care is sometimes treated by courts-and the relatives themselves-as
competing care which should result in a reward to the caretaking relative.
128
For example, a 2006 Maryland case granted grandparents visitation with their
grandchildren, despite parental objections and the fact that the parents' fitness
was not disputed and the family was intact. 129 The court stressed that the
grandparents "actively participated in the care and raising" of the first born
granddaughter (who, for the first three years of her life, resided with her mother
in the grandparents' house) and continued to keep a "close relationship" with
her afterwards.' The court concluded that "the [c]hildren 'were part of the
[grandparents'] life on a fairly regular basis"' and benefited from having such a
relationship with their grandparents, and ordered the parents to renew the
relationship. 131 The Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently reversed this
decision and raised the bar for granting grandparental visitation over parental
objection by requiring that grandparents show not only that visitation was in the
best interest of the child, but also that "the lack of grandparental visitation has a
significant deleterious effect upon the children ... ,,132 Nevertheless, for the
purpose of this Article it is important that the court of appeals shared the trial
court's view that the care grandparents provided competed with parental care
rather than adding to it the way paid caretakers' did. The statute, the court
noted, allows grandparents "to play a vital role in the development and
children co-parent the minors in three-generation households, or grandmothers provide care during the
day to their grandchildren who live in two-generation households); Rebecca L. Hegar, The Cultural
Roots of Kinship Care, in KINSHIP FOSTER CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH 17, 22 (Rebecca
L. Hegar & Maria Scannapieco eds., 1999) (claiming that the historical pattern of black parents relying
on kin caretaking persists today and appears to be on the rise since the 1980s); Rosalyn D. Lee, Margaret
E. Ensminger & Thomas A. LaVeist, African American Grandmothers: The Responsibility Continuum,
in CUSTODIAL GRANDPARENTING, supra, at 119, 120 (arguing that kinship care has historically been
more common in African-American families than in other groups in the United States).
127. J.P.M. v. T.D.M, 932 So. 2d 760, 778 (Miss. 2006) (finding that grandparents' willingness and
ability to help a parent may weigh in that parent's favor); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 660 N.W.2d 196, 203
(N.D. 2003) (stating that a child's "interactions and interrelationships with relatives" can be considered
in the assessment of the child's family environment).
128. Spaulding v. Williams, 793 N.E. 2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (granting visitation to
grandparents because they had acted like parents in caring daily for their grandson for over three years
while their daughter, the child's mother, was at work, and despite the wishes of the child's father, who
had broken their relationship with the child after their daughter's death); Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875
(Pa. 2006) (affirming the grandmother's grant of partial custody where the grandmother cared for child
daily during her daughter's-the child's mother-terminal illness); In re Estate of S.T.T., 144 P.3d 1083
(Utah 2006) (holding that visitation award to grandparents, who cared regularly for the child and moved
in with the child after the mother died, was constitutional).
129. Koshko v. Haining, 897 A.2d 866 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
130. Id. at 868-69.
131. Id. at 883 (citation omitted).
132. Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 192-93 (Md. 2007). Alternatively, the newly-created
threshold allows grandparents to prevail if they show parental unfitness. Id.
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happiness of a child's life, when circumstances are such that court action is
warranted and needed to enforce that role properly. . . . 'Grandparents'
contributions do not go unnoticed and their efforts likely accrue to the benefit
of the grandchildren."1
33
A recent New York case enumerated the tasks that a grandmother
performed that made her a "surrogate, live-in mother" to her recently orphaned
grandson:
[For over three years, the] grandmother comforted, supported and
cared for the motherless child. She got him ready for school, put him
to bed, read with him, helped him with his homework, cooked his
meals, laundered his clothes and drove him to school and to doctor's
appointments and various activities .... 134
The child's father, who had asked the grandmother to move in and help with
his son's care, was enjoined by the court from putting an end to the child's
relationship with his grandmother, even though he believed that she was
"sabotaging his parental authority and competing with him for control over the
household and, more importantly, the child."'135 Note the implications of
utilizing one care arrangement and not another. Had the father hired a resident
paid caretaker instead of asking the grandmother for help, and had that
caretaker performed these exact same tasks for three years, the father would
have found himself at liberty to end the relationship as he wished.
Whereas parents might find this trend a sufficient reason for concern,
scholars have argued that extensive reliance on kin care might lead courts to
see parents as indifferent and neglecting: The caretaking relative is depicted as
filling a void, not as lending a hand. 136 Such charges of neglect often lead to
placement in state-paid foster care, especially when the parents in question are
poor. 137 Since in recent years there has been a trend to place children in formal
133. Id. at 191 (emphasis added) (quoting McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 816 (Md.
2005)). The court of appeals remanded and instructed the lower court to give the grandparents an
opportunity to convince the court that such exceptional circumstances existed in their case (or that the
parents were unfit). Id. at 195.
134. E.S. v. P.D., No. 01336, 2007 WL 470389, at *1 (N.Y. Feb. 15, 2007).
135. /d. at *2.
136. Dorothy Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1619, 1623 (2001).
137. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 27 (2002)
("Poverty-not the type or severity of maltreatment-is the single most important predictor of
placement in foster care and the amount of time spent there."); Kathy Barbell & Madelyn Freundlich,
Foster Care Today: Overview of Family Foster Care, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY: A
HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 504, 505-06 (Gerald P. Mallon & Peg McCartt
Hess eds., 2005) ("[C]hildren living in poverty are far more likely to be reported to child protective
services as victims of child neglect... [and] the major determinant of children's removal from their
parents' custody [is] not the severity of child maltreatment but the instability of parental income."); see
also Francesca M. Cancian, Defining "Good" Child Care: Hegemonic and Democratic Standards, in
CHILD CARE AND INEQUALITY: RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 65, 67 (Francesca
M. Cancian et al. eds., 2002) (surveying studies that show that "[t]he great majority of children in foster
care and in the child welfare system are from poor and minority families" and "[nleglect, not abuse, is
the usual grounds for removing children from their families"); Christina White, Federally Mandated
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kin foster care, 138 a finding that parents are neglectful when they leave their
children for long hours in the care of relatives can yield distorted results. When
relatives informally help parents, the state sometimes holds it against parents.
139
Yet, the same relatives can become designated foster parents, which would
entitle them to better state assistance than the parents originally had. 4 ' Social
services and courts send parents and their communities the message that a
parent relying heavily on extended family for child care is a neglecting parent,
even if at the end of the day the children end up being cared for by the same
relatives. 141
Scholars have persuasively argued that the state's perception of extensive
kin care as indicative of parental neglect is informed by cultural and class
bias. 142 However, the comparison with other types of child care highlights
another facet of kin care, namely that it clashes with the basic assumptions of
the exclusive family doctrine. Grandparents, uncles, and aunts are not
perceived as different from-and therefore complementary to-parents.
Instead, their similarity to parents paints them as potential rivals, and as such,
their input is not counted favorably to the parents.
For similar reasons, parents who rely on non-paid help of friends or
neighbors are more likely to face a problem. A Louisiana custody dispute
serves as an instructive example. Upon divorce, Sally Lunsford, a mother of
three, had to seek full-time employment. Juggling work and household chores,
it was a blessing for her to have her friend Mary around the house. The
daughter of a colleague, and Sally's best friend, Mary visited the house daily,
doing family and household chores and often spending the night. 143 Yet, two
Destruction of the Black Family: The Adoption and Safe Family Act, I Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 303, 314
(2006) ("[T]here is a strong correlation between foster care placement and poverty.").
138. Barbell & Freundlich, supra note 137, at 509 (describing the "dramatic" increase in recent
years in the formal use of kinship care); Jill Duerr Berrick, When Children Cannot Remain Home:
Foster Family Care and Kinship Care, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 72, 73 (1998). In some states, kin foster care
has even become the popular solution in situations of termination of parental rights. Maria Scannapiedo
& Rebecca L. Hegar, Kinship Foster Care in Context, in KINSHIP FOSTER CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE,
AND RESEARCH 1, 3 (Rebecca L. Hegar & Maria Scannapieco eds., 1999).
139. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the
Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 585-86 (1997).
140. Berrick, supra note 138, at 74-75 (describing the higher state assistance relatives receive when
caring for children as foster parents as one of the reasons for the rise in kinship placements in recent
years).
141. Roberts, supra note 136, at 1623.
142. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 139, at 586 ("Because the rich tradition of extended family or kin
care is not normative, the child protection system does not recognize it as family and views the mothers
who rely on that tradition as having abrogated their maternal roles and duties.").
143. Lunsford v. Lunsford, 545 So. 2d 1279, 1280-81 (La. Ct. App. 1989). The trial court
insinuated heavily that it suspected Sally's relationship with Mary to be sexual and conditioned the
award of custody to Sally subject to severe restrictions on their relationship. The appellate court
completely rejected these insinuations, yet found it material to declare that Sally had complied with the
limitations imposed by the trial court. Even though the trial court and the appellate court differed in their
interpretation of the nature of the relationship, they were of one mind in regard to the importance of
Sally's independence as the head of the household.
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courts regarded Mary's help as a sign of Sally's weakness. Sally was instructed
to become "self-reliant" by tempering her reliance on her friend "so that the
household be dependent upon itself and not on an outside source.' 44 In this
case, asking a friend for help was not considered providing quality care; rather,
it was considered a manifestation of incompetence.
D. Conclusion
This comparison of the judicial treatment of different types of caretaking
arrangements illuminates the conceptual infrastructure underlying courts'
understanding of paid caretaking. In-home paid caretakers are the only type of
caretakers whose work is treated as an extension of parental care. In-home paid
caretakers are not considered persons, as grandparents or day care center
providers are. Rather, courts reduce them to the service they provide, one
which fills a certain gap in parental conduct. Recall Dr. Shofner's award of
custody, which was based on his taking parenting classes and hiring an in-home
caretaker. The caretaker was considered an addition to the father, just like the
newly taught skills; both were means of making Dr. Shofner a better-
functioning parent. By refraining from closer examination of paid caretakers,
courts perpetuate the illusion that the care they provide can be disconnected
from the person who provides it. The paid caretaker becomes a mere "extra pair
of hands."'145 Only in this abstract form can paid caretakers be constructed as a
flexible solution tailored to fit any parental deficiency and family situation. In
this capacity, the concept of "nanny" has become instrumental for judges in
reconciling the contradictions between the ideals of the exclusive family that
the law holds onto, and the real life families with whose problems courts are
confronted. To achieve this level of abstraction and to produce an ideal
solution, courts strip paid in-home caretakers of personality and treat them as
interchangeable and disposable. Treating paid in-home caretakers this way
allows the legal system to portray the nuclear family as self-reliant.
144. Id. at 1280, 1283. In fact, the appellate court noted with approval that under the threat of
change of custody, Sally indeed changed her behavior. Mary's daily assistance diminished in the year
preceding the appellate court hearing: She shopped for Sally only five times, and helped with the
laundry occasionally. Sally testified that "she personally performed all other household chores." Id. at
1283. The appellate court considered this point important enough to list Sally's daily schedule, and to
enumerate the chores she performed, "including washing clothes and dishes, ironing, and making
lunches for the children." Id. at 1281.
145. Caitlin Flanagan recalls the comfort she found in the notion that the in-home caretaker she was
about to hire was no more than "two helpful appendages.., no more of a human presence in the
household than the useful refrigerator, the attractive white changing table." CAITLIN FLANAGAN, TO
HELL WITH ALL THAT: LOVING AND LOATHING OUR INNER HOUSEWIFE 108-09 (2006). She goes on to
describe the difficulties she experienced when confronted with the caretaker's humanity as mirrored in
the love Flanagan's children came to feel for her: "That I knew my boys would love her is why I hired
her. That they did was unnerving me to the core." Id. at 123.
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III. IDEAL AND PRACTICE IN IN-HOME CARETAKING
The focus in custody decisions is on children's welfare. When courts
contemplate caretaking arrangements, they are informed by widespread
conceptions about what children's needs are and what good parenting entails.
Therefore, to make sense of the "nanny cases," this Part examines the
prevailing cultural conceptions of parenting. After reviewing the shift in
childrearing ideology from intensive motherhood to concerted cultivation, I
evaluate this shift's consequences, drawing on data accumulated by
sociologists. The data show that the combination of contemporary childrearing
ideology and the realities of the care market creates incentives for parents to
subordinate caretakers, with possible grave costs for the children in their
charge. As a result, a custody decision that assumes that in-home caretaking is
advantageous to children without examining the caretaker's work conditions is
likely to be flawed.
Stepping out of the doctrinal boundaries of custody law, this Part also
evaluates the "nanny cases" from a feminist point of view. To the extent that
custody cases involving in-home caretaking legitimize maternal reliance on
paid caretaking, one might argue that they represent a positive development
from a feminist perspective because they allow mothers to pursue meaningful
careers without losing their status as good mothers. This Part takes a different
stance, insisting that a feminist evaluation of in-home caretaking must take into
account the caretakers' perspective and inspect more carefully the source of
paid caretaking's new legitimacy. Such scrutiny reveals that this so-called
victory benefits only upper-middle-class women and is largely achieved at the
expense of female immigrant caretakers (and their families). In fact, in some
contemporary wealthy families, the paid caretaker has come to replace "The
Wife": unappreciated, lacking authority, poorly rewarded economically, and
strictly controlled by the masters of the house. 146
A. Childrearing Ideology.- From Intensive Mothering to Concerted Cultivation
Since the 1980s, middle- and upper-middle-class childrearing ideology has
been focused on the development of the child's skills and intellectual capacities
through constant stimulation and challenge-setting.' 47 This childrearing
146. Hochschild, supra note 73, at 20.
147. I only briefly touch upon lower-class parents' childrearing ideology because paid in-home
caretaking is an unattainable child care solution for parents of low means. See Romero, supra note 2.
The childrearing ideologies described below are tailored to the sensibilities, and financial abilities, of the
middle- and upper-middle-classes. Indeed, interviews with lower-class and poor mothers show that these
mothers see their role not as providing their children with choices and negotiating with them to promote
their self-esteem, but as stressing children's obedience to rules and providing formal education.
However, Sharon Hays notes that today, mothers of all classes share fundamental assumptions about the
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ideology, which sociologist Annette Lareau termed "concerted cultivation,"
prompts parents to enroll children in a series of adult-controlled organized
activities.148 It requires "immense emotional involvement, constant self-
sacrificing,.., and a completely child-centered environment."' 149 It also entails
extensive direct and indirect expenses, taking a toll on parents' financial
resources, time, and energy.150
Adopting such labor-intensive methods is, for many parents, a reaction to
the demands of advanced capitalist societies. Their hope is to increase their
children's competitiveness and prospects of success in the years to come by
engaging them from an early age in educational activities and dedicating
substantial amounts of time and effort to foster their children's cognitive
development.151 The increasing competition for admission to quality education
institutions (college, high school, even urban nursery school) evokes parents'
fear that their children will be deprived as adults of the lifestyle within which
152they have grown up. By setting a rigid schedule of educational activities,
parents hope to cultivate in their offspring "skills and dispositions that [will]
help them navigate the institutional world" awaiting them.
53
The focus on intellectual development and the acquisition of competitive
skills marks a paradigm shift in childrearing theory. Before the 1980s,
childrearing in middle- and upper-middle-class families took the form of
intensive mothering, which emphasized the mother-child relationship, and
promoted the fulfillment of children's desires as a means of achieving their
successful development. 54 Child development experts hailed children's
attachment to mothers and maternal bonding as the main sources of children's
significance of dedicating themselves to providing for their children's needs. SHARON HAYS, THE
CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 86 (1996).
148. Annette Lareau, Invisible Inequality: Social Class and Childrearing in Black Families and
White Families, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 747, 752 (2002); see also Teresa Arendell, "Soccer Moms" and the
New Care Work 8 (Berkeley Ctr. for Working Families, Working Paper No. 16, 2000) (referring to
researchers' finding that American children's involvement in organized activities outside their homes
has risen in the past decades).
149. Romero, supra note 2, at 834.
150. Direct expenses include the salary of tutors and cost of lessons and equipment. Indirect
expenses include the loss of parental leisure, the time and cost of chauffeuring children, and the cost of
time taken off from work. Lareau, supra note 148, at 757.
151. See Tronto, supra note 9, at 41-42.
152. BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 83 (1989)
(explaining that the "barriers that the middle class erected to protect itself make it painfully difficult to
reproduce itself'); JUDITH D. SCHWARTZ, THE MOTHER PUZZLE: A NEW GENERATION RECKONS WITH
MOTHERHOOD 251 (1993) ("If it comes down to brute survival of the fittest, we want to make our
children know how to wind up on top. With uncertainty all around us, we want to provide our children
with every certainty we can-and backups, just in case."); Lareau, supra note 148, at 771 (noting that
middle-class parents' worry over their economic future and their children's economic futures has
increased their commitment to inculcating in their children the skills that will enhance their future
possibilities).
153. ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOOD: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 5, 39 (2003).
154. DIANE EYER, MOTHERGUILT: HOW OUR CULTURE BLAMES MOTHERS FOR WHAT'S WRONG
WITH SOCIETY 83-86 (1996); HAYS, supra note 147, at 45.
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self-esteem, sense of security, and happiness.' 55 Both attachment theory and
bonding theory designate mothers as biologically suited to care for children and
identify constant maternal attention and affection as the key factors in a child's
development. 156 Intensive mothering requires emotionally and financially
absorbing methods, and its cornerstone is unconditional maternal love.'
57
Specifically, it fosters the expectation that the child's needs and desires be met
as they occur, shifts from an obedience-based model of education to a
reasoning-based one, and relies on a frustrating and taxing process of setting
limits to encourage children to self-discipline.'
58
The requirements of intensive mothering clashed with the major shift in
mothers' labor market participation over the last three decades of the twentieth
century. 159 The Bureau of Labor reports that in 2001, the predominant family
employment pattern in the United States was for both parents to work full-
time. 160 This is a clear departure from the dominant pattern in 1980 when,
among middle-class married couples, most husbands worked full-time and most
wives did not work outside the home.' 6' Combined with the rise in the number
of single-parent households,' 62 historically headed by mothers working full-
155. HAYS, supra note 147, at 55. Attachment is described as a survival instinct causing children to
stay close to their caretaker. Bonding is said to be a corresponding "maternal instinct... that requires
mothers to lovingly hold their babies right after birth and stay close to them in the ensuing months."
EYER, supra note 154, at 69. Failures in children's lives and characters are attributed to "attachment
disorder"--the deficit of proper maternal care-and hence blamed on mothers. Id. at 71. Attachment,
bonding, and attachment disorder became a primary part of any explanation of child development in the
1970s. Arlene Skolnick, Solomon's Children: The New Biologism, Psychological Parenthood,
Attachment Theory, and the Best Interests Standard, in ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW
CENTURY 236, 244-45 (Mary Ann Mason et al. eds., 1998). For criticism of these theories, see SUSAN
CHIRA, A MOTHER'S PLACE: TAKING THE DEBATE ABOUT WORKING MOTHERS BEYOND GUILT AND
BLAME 72 (1998), which notes that attachment theory made no distinctions between long-term and
short-term separation and used data regarding war orphans living in orphanages to make general
statements about maternal absence, even a temporary absence; and EYER, supra note 154, at 83-84,
which explains that bonding theory is based on research involving goats.
156. EYER, supra note 154, at 84.
157. HAYS, supra note 147, at 111. In intensive mothering, maternal love is not just a natural
phenomenon, but the child's prerogative and the measure by which both maternal competence and
children's futures are determined. For anyone who grew up with intensive motherhood, these notions
might seem "natural." It can be sobering to remember that as late as the 1940s, psychiatrists vehemently
argued that maternal overprotection-defined as excessive mother-child contact and maternal provision
of all the child's needs-was one of the main causes of (mostly male) children's immaturity, lack of
confidence, undeveloped personality, impotence, and homosexuality. See DAVID M. LEVY, MATERNAL
OVERPROTECTION (1943); EDUARD STRECKER, THEIR MOTHERS' SONS (1946).
158. HAYS, supra note 147, at 59-61.
159. Indeed, John Bowlby, an influential psychologist, compared a mother's full-time employment
to the death of a parent or a social catastrophe (such as war) in terms of the effect on the child. See Carol
Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 415 (1996).
160. Gary Martin & Vladimir Kats, Families and Work in Transition in 12 Countries 1980-2001,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 15 (2003); see Macdonald, supra note 98, at 245-46 ("Working class and poor
women have always engaged in paid labor.").
161. Martin & Kats, supra note 160, at 3. The so called "traditional family," in which a father is the
sole wage earner, represented only 25% of all families with children in 1988, a decrease from 44% in
1975. COONTZ, supra note 63, at 18.
162. Martin & Kats, supra note 160, at 13 ("By the year 1995, more than I out of 4 U.S.
households with children were single-parent households, up from I out of 5 in 1980."). Most single-
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time,163 these changes created a rapid increase in the proportion of mothers who
work outside the home and have young children. According to the U.S. Census,
in 1999, more than sixty percent of all mothers with children under six years
old were employed, 164 with white middle-class women playing a leading role in
this trend.165 Although it has been suggested that professional women have
recently been leaving the work force because of the strain of combining
employment with motherhood, 166 economists have dismissed the idea that
women are "opting out," or even choosing part-time employment, after
becoming mothers. 1
67
However, this demographic change in household work patterns has not
been accompanied by a corresponding change in the traditional allocation of
child care responsibilities.168 Instead, as mentioned above, intensive
parent households are headed by women. Thus in 2000 mother-only households comprised 24% of
families with children, whereas father-only households constituted only 4%. JEFFREY SCOTT TURNER,
FAMILIES IN AMERICA 64 (2002).
163. Linda J. Waite & Mark Nielsen, The Rise of the Dual-Earner Family, 1963-1997, in
WORKING FAMILIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 23, 28 (Rosanna Hertz & Nancy
L. Marshall eds., 2001) (revealing that, in 1997, 58% of single mothers worked full-time, a moderate
increase from 50% in 1963). In a 1993 survey of employment patterns of mothers to children under six
years old, "51 percent of divorced women and 26 percent of never-married women worked full-time."
Stephen D. Sugarman, Single-Parent Families, in ALL OUR FAMILIES, supra note 155, at 13, 17.
•164. This is an increase from fifty-four percent in 1989. See Martin & Kats, supra note 160, at 18
tbl.9. The percentage of employed married mothers was roughly the same. See Paula J. Dubeck, Preface
to the Second Edition, in WORKPLACE/WOMEN'S PLACE: AN ANTHOLOGY, at xiv (Paula J. Dubeck &
Dana Dunn eds., 2002) (setting the percentage of employed married women with children under the age
of three at 61.8%, based on U.S. Census data from 2000).
165. Mark Evan Edwards, Uncertainty and the Rise of the Work-Family Dilemma, 63 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 183, 186 (2001) (stating that economic uncertainty and the fear of downward mobility were the
key reasons for the rapid increase in two-eamer households).
166. This supposed trend was heralded by the New York Times and other periodicals in several
highly controversial articles. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (identifying a trend among educated, high-income women who give up their
employment to take care of their children); Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career
Path to Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at AI (claiming that a survey of female Yale students
reveals that an increasing number of undergraduates plan to retire at thirty to become stay-at-home
moms); Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 50. For criticism of these
publications, see, for example, Katha Pollitt, Desperate Housewives of the Iy League?, NATION, Oct.
17, 2005, at 14; and Rebecca Traister, The Stay-at-Home Mystique, SALON, Dec. 6, 2005,
http://dir.salon.com/story/mwt/feature/ 2005/12/06/total_ I 80/index.html.
167. Heather Boushey has argued that the decline in the percentage of mothers' participation in the
work force since 2000 is tied to the weakness of the labor market for all workers since the 2001
recession. Mothers have dropped out of the job market at a rate similar to other women, while the
economic impact of having children continued to diminish. HEATHER BOUSHEY, CTR. FOR ECON. &
POL'Y RESEARCH, ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT? DEBUNKING THE MYTH (2005).
168. Women have retained primary responsibility for raising their children. ROMERO, supra note
74, at 95; Linda Kelly, The Fantastic Adventure of Supermom and the Alien: Educating Immigration
Policy on the Facts of Life, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1999); Lynet Uttal & Mary Tuominen,
Tenuous Relationships: Exploitation, Emotions, and Racial Ethnic Significance in Paid Child Care
Work, 13 GENDER & SOC'Y 758, 770 (1999). The New York Times reported that researchers from the
University of Maryland have recently found that in two-parent families, women still perform twice as
many child care tasks as do men. Robert Pear, Married and Single Parents Spending More Time with
Children, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A12 (noting that married mothers spent an average
of 12.9 hours a week on child care in 2000, compared with 6.5 hours a week for married fathers).
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motherhood has been adjusted. Alongside a discourse of family crisis, which
urges mothers to return to the home' 69 and still emphasizes the mother-child
bond, the focus of good mothering ideology has subtly shifted toward an
emphasis on children's intellectual growth. Children's sense of security,
happiness, and self-esteem are still considered important goals of childrearing,
but they are no longer sufficient.'
70
The "concerted cultivation" childrearing ideology demands even more
time-consuming and expensive methods of child care than intensive mothering.
It also allows for reliance on external help, help which was demonized as the
deprivation of maternal care only two decades earlier. Because intensive
mothering emphasized maternal bonding and attachment, the ideology had
room for only one primary caretaker 171 and this mother-child bond "eroded
mothers' reliance on the assistance of others."' 72 But the growing shift toward
concerted cultivation has made non-maternal care less problematic.
Specifically, concerted cultivation makes in-home paid caretaking more
attractive because in-home caretaking provides children with constant adult
attention in the children's home, under parental direction and supervision.
173
The legal decisions that were discussed in the first Part embody this thinking in
that they assume that children need, or at least benefit from, paid in-home
caretaking.
B. Paid In-Home Caretaking Meets Concerted Cultivation
From a feminist perspective, one could argue that the legal
acknowledgement of the advantages of in-home paid caretaking signifies a
positive development. Working mothers still face mixed responses, even
though their legal right to work is no longer in dispute. 174 The change of focus
in childrearing ideology, from emphasizing the maternal bond to concentrating
on children's skills and intellectual development, may free mothers to pursue
meaningful careers without being labeled as-and made to feel like-bad
mothers. Seen in this light, the court's decision in Forzano v. Scuderi is
169. See DANIELLE CRITTENDEN, WHAT OUR MOTHERS DIDN'T TELL US: WHY HAPPINESS
ELUDES THE MODERN WOMAN 113-43 (1999); EBERSTADT, supra note 107, at 172; SUZANNE VENKER,
7 MYTHS OF WORKING MOTHERS: WHY CHILDREN AND (MOST) CAREERS JUST DON'T MIX 152-63
(2004).
170. Arendell, supra note 148, at 3 (arguing that parents' responsibilities for their children's
development and growth are "an expansion from the middle of the 20th century when parents were
accountable primarily for children's general well-being").
171. Macdonald, supra note 98, at 246; see also HAYS, supra note 147, at 55.
172. Macdonald, supra note 98, at 246.
173. Tronto, supra note 9, at 43-45.
174. See Edwards, supra note 165, at 185 (noting that "[t]he American public... remain[s] divided
about the wisdom of and reasons for so many young mothers in the labor force") (internal citation
omitted); Sanger, supra note 159, at 465 (pointing out that while "most of the blanket prohibitions
against maternal employment are gone ... the preference for mother-child togetherness continues").
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testimony to a feminist victory. The Forzano court allowed the mother
radiologist to work full-time in a demanding professional job without losing her
status as a good mother or even as a primary caretaker.
Moreover, concerted cultivation seems to incentivize parents to seek
experienced, educated caretakers because they want their children's caretakers
to be able to actively contribute to each child's competitiveness. Putting high
value on enriching environments, parents can be expected to look for educated
class peers who are likely to share their values of childrearing. iv Such a
development could further serve women in general by putting a high market
value on caretaking, the lack of which has been a cause of feminist lamentation
for years. 176 Furthermore, since highly trained, educated workers are more
likely to be able to negotiate good work conditions, concerted cultivation would
motivate parents not only to choose highly-paid workers but also to utilize non-
exploitive employment practices. If we object to the demonization of working
mothers, think that care work should entail high status, and want children to
benefit from devoted adult attention, then perhaps we should strive to make
decisions like Forzano v. Scuderi the norm.
However, data accumulated by sociologists regarding in-home caretaking
and the legal perception of caretaking as manifested in the "nanny cases"
suggest otherwise. Indeed, the combination of the concerted cultivation
ideology with the reality of the care market increases the risk of caretakers'
subordination and of the devaluation of care work. Most employers cannot
afford, and many do not seek, educated, class-peer caretakers. Instead, they hire
lower-class or immigrant caretakers that many employers perceive as
subordinate. These caretakers report being viewed as possessing little ability to
contribute to children's concerted cultivation and are relegated to the most
laborious and repetitive tasks of child rearing, with the imperative to be loving
and maternal.
Class-peer highly-skilled child care is very expensive and relatively few
such caretakers are available. 17 It becomes even more costly when we take into
175. Parents who seek class peers for caretakers may choose from a pool of American college
students, European au pairs, Irish and British in-home caretakers, and young women from the American
Midwest. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 51.
176. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
To DO ABOUT IT 124-27 (2000) (suggesting that in doing the lion's share of housework and caretaking,
wives are entitled to an equal share in the fruits of their husbands' labor upon divorce); Naomi R. Cahn,
The Coin of the Realm: Poverty and the Commodification of Gendered Labor, 5 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 1, 17-22 (2001) (describing the benefits poor mothers are likely to gain if their caretaking work is
commodified); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1899-903 (2000) (arguing that
the conversion of unpaid household work into paid work by non-family members is beneficial because it
allows better protection for the women who perform it, renders housework more visible and publicly
accountable, and frees unpaid family members to pursue gainful work); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning
Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 86 (1996) (advocating that housework
be regarded as value producing work, even though unpaid, for legal purposes).
177. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 55. Wrigley reported in 1995 that a British caretaker could earn
$600-$700 a week and some received extensive perks, id. at 72, compared to the $150-$180 usually paid
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account that, unlike immigrant and lower-class caretakers, peer caretakers are
harder to control and unlikely to be hassled into doing housework tasks. 78 The
head of a Manhattan domestic employment agency explained that she failed to
place a twenty-seven-year-old American woman, whom she described as "the
best," because employers hesitated to hire high status employees: "If
someone's your equal, you can't say 'Clean the dishes, do the laundry.' This is
terrible to say, but perhaps they think these other women are beneath them."'
' 79
That is not to say that hiring a class peer necessarily implies that parents
relinquish their desire to control their caretakers. While parents want class-peer
caretakers to operate with confidence and authority, they also try to enforce the
schedule and contents they desire, to make sure caretakers' days are child-
centered and all activities are educationally enriching.' 80 They invest a great
deal of money in these caretakers, and it is hardly surprising that they want to
make sure that their money is well spent. Even among the wealthy, plenty of
parents opt for hiring an employee from a different class and cultural
background.1
81
In-home paid caretaking in the United States is typically performed by
poor women with few alternatives. 182 Historically, these were African-
American women. 183 In the last two decades, domestic work has become the
domain of female immigrant workers from developing countries.1 84 These
women are pushed to migrate by economic strife, 185 and pulled to the United
to newly arrived immigrant caretakers, id. at 23-25. Richardson and Torres found that the median
weekly salary for caretakers and domestic workers in South Texas was sixty-five dollars per week. Chad
Richardson & Cruz C. Torres, "Only a Maid": Undocumented Domestic Workers in South Texas, in
CHAD RICHARDSON, BATOS, BOLILLOS, POCHOS & PELADOS: CLASS & CULTURE ON THE SOUTH TEXAS
BORDER 69, 83 (1999). See also Romero, supra note 2, at 817 (summarizing the findings of several
researchers regarding care workers' wages).
178. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 49.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id. at 54-55.
181. A recent New York Times article suggests that, for some professional parents, the choice of
class-peer caretakers is practically non-existent. According to the article, many credentialed caretakers
refuse to work for black parents, who are then left to choose from a pool of illegal immigrants and non-
English speakers. Jodi Kantor, Nanny Hunt Can Be a 'Slap in the Face'for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2006, at Al.
182. See ROMERO, supra note 74, at 94-95 (referring to minority domestic workers generally).
183. By 1989 only 3.5% of African-American women held service jobs in private households,
compared to 37.5% in 1960. Terry A. Repak, Labor Recruitment and the Lure of the Capital: Central
American Migrants in Washington DC, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF GENDER AND CAREWORK 65, 66
(Mary K. Zimmerman et al. eds., 2006) (quoting research done in 1990 by Marilyn Power for the
Institute for Women's Policy Research). In 1995 fewer than 17% (about 137,000) of domestic workers
in general were black women. ANN CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 222 (2001).
184. BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK? THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DOMESTIC
LABOUR 150 (2000) (noting that numbers are extremely difficult to gauge but accumulated evidence
shows that in the United States "increasing numbers of immigrant women [are] working in private
households"); HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 17 (stating that Mexican, Caribbean, and Central
American women predominate today in metropolitan centers as in-home paid caretakers).
185. See CHANG, supra note 126, at 123-24 (explaining that since the 1980s, international financial
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have placed stipulations on
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States by employers' preference for immigrant domestic workers.1 86 As Rhacel
Salazar Parrefias has succinctly put it, "The hierarchy of womanhood-
involving race, class, and nation, as well as gender-establishes a work transfer
system of reproductive labor among women, the international transfer of
caretaking."'1 87 Visas for domestic workers are strictly limited in number, and
thousands of workers enter the United States through illegal channels.' 88
Parents who hire lower-class or immigrant caretakers often perceive these
caretakers as subordinates. 189 Still they aim to provide their children with
stimulating child care that will enhance their intellectual development. This is
where the internal logic of concerted cultivation accounts for the high risk of
caretakers' mistreatment. First, concerted cultivation encourages parents to
pursue a high level of control over caretakers. 19° Since parents want their
children to continuously improve, many of them are very strict about the way
caretakers spend their time with the children, the activities in which they
engage, and the child-focused environment they are expected to create. Julia
Wrigley sums it up this way: "Parents can benefit from their caregivers' labor
only if they control it. This requires thought, effort, and a certain
ruthlessness."' 91 Many parents expect caretakers to work without taking a
break, to constantly react to the child, and to fulfill all of his or her needs as
they arise. Some employers go so far as to actively seek undocumented non-
loans to developing countries, requiring them to engage in structural adjustments programs (SAPs) that
mainly affect women, who pay for the dismantling of social programs both in their countries of origin
and in developed countries); Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and
Women's Work, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1, 57 ("Many Third World countries increasingly depend upon the
export of women and women's domestic service. Women in the Third World have become
indispensable in providing cheap labor to the 'global capitalist economy."'). A survey done among
undocumented domestic workers from Mexico revealed that most of them were pushed to migrate in
search of work that would support their parents or complement their husbands' earning. Richardson &
Torres, supra note 177, at 72.
186. Maria de Ia Luz Ibarra, Creen Que No Tenemos Vidas: Mexicana Household Workers in
Santa Barbara, California, in MORE THAN CLASS: STUDYING POWER IN U.S. WORKPLACES 148, 151
(Ann E. Kingsolver ed., 1998).
187. RHACEL SALAZAR PARRERAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION: WOMEN, MIGRATION, AND
DOMESTIC WORK 78 (2001).
188. Caretakers have three legal ways to enter the United States for work. The first is with the use
of special visas: "A-3 visas to work for ambassadors, diplomats, consular officers, public ministers, and
their families; G-5 visas to work for officers and employees of international organizations or of foreign
missions to international organizations and their families; and B-I visas to accompany U.S. citizens who
reside abroad but are visiting the United States or assigned to the United States temporarily ... or [to
accompany] foreign nationals with nonimmigrant status in the United States." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HIDDEN IN THE HOME: ABUSE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS WITH SPECIAL VISAS IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(2001) (citations omitted). The second is to enter as part of the au pair program with the "visiting
scholar" visa (J-1), usually used to bring young middle-class European students to care for children for a
limited time. Young, supra note 185, at 48. The third is with a temporary employment visa (H2-B). Id.
189. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 4-5. Women who migrate to work in developed countries do not
usually come from the poorest classes of their society and are typically better educated and more
affluent than male migrants. Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild, Introduction, in GLOBAL
WOMAN, supra note 73, at 1, 10.
190. Tronto, supra note 9, at 44.
191. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 99.
2008]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 19:305
citizen caretakers because they are more likely to be compliant. 192 Caretakers
are supposed to provide care without having "much authority over the children
or in planning activities."1 93 Instead of bringing up children, some caretakers
find themselves waiting on and serving them.
1 94
The second manner in which concerted cultivation motivates subordination
is related to the expectations and preferences that parents form based on the
caretaker's race, ethnicity, religion, and class.' 95 Many parent employers judge
prospective employees according to racialized conceptions of "warmth, love for
children, and naturalness in mothering."' 96 Sociologists found that "employers
often use socioeconomic status, immigrant status, and racial group membership
to define the subordinate social status of workers."'' 97 Parents who perceive
caretakers as culturally subordinate often do not trust the caretakers to give
their children the stimulation that concerted cultivation requires. 198 These
parents retain for themselves intellectual tasks like reading and helping with
homework and cultural tasks like shopping, and leave to caretakers the less
creative and more physical and repetitive tasks of child care. 199 These parents
classify the domestic chores performed by unprivileged women as unimportant
to children's development, a perception that reinforces the notion that
192. Mary Romero, Immigration, the Servant Problem and the Legacy of the Domestic Labor
Debate: "Where Can You Find Good Help These Days!, " 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1060-61 (1998).
193. Romero, supra note 2, at 819.
194. Id. Julia Wrigley reports that some of the parents she interviewed expressed the belief that
their children were intellectually superior to the caretakers they employed. See WRIGLEY, supra note 4,
at 41.
195. Abigail B. Bakan & Daiva K. Stasiulis, Making the Match: Domestic Placement Agencies and
the Racialization of Women's Household Work, 20 SIGNS 303, 310 (1995) (finding that in Canada as
well as the United States, racialized stereotypes inform employers' expectations of potential employees,
and as a result play into domestic placement agencies' decisions); Romero, supra note 2, at 835; Mary
Romero, Unraveling Privilege: Workers' Children and the Hidden Costs of Paid Childcare, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1651, 1663 (2001).
196. Romero, supra note 2, at 835 (internal quotation omitted); see also PARRERAS, supra note
187, at 177-79 (finding that both in Rome and in Los Angeles migrant Filipina domestic workers are
usually paid higher salaries than blacks and Latinas and that the different treatment owes partly to the
stereotype attached to Filipinas, such as "nice" and "hardworking," as well as to their better command of
the English language).
197. Shellee Colen, "With Respect and Feelings ": Voices of West Indian Child Care and Domestic
Workers in New York City, in ALL AMERICAN WOMEN: LINES THAT DIVIDE, TIES THAT BIND 46, 55
(Johnnetta B. Cole ed., 1986) ("The assignment of [child care and domestic labor] to those with low
status, by virtue of gender, and racial and ethnic hierarchies, reinforces these hierarchies."); Uttal &
Tuominen, supra note 168, at 772.
198. Parental distrust of caretakers' abilities also accounts for caretakers' diminishing utility to
middle-class parents as the children in their charge grow older. See WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 40-41
(finding that no matter how attentive the caretaker and how satisfactory parents had found her to begin
with, parents tend to move their children "into their own cultural orbit" as they get older and immigrant
caretakers generally lose their hold on their jobs after children become verbal).
199. Romero, supra note 2, at 819-20; see also WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 111-12 (stating that
parents retain control over four main categories: discipline, safety, health, and nutrition).
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caretakers are interchangeable and the presumption that caretakers do not
perform a parental role in their children's lives.
200
The risk of exploitation is further aggravated by the work conditions most
in-home caretakers face. With a few exceptions,2°  domestic workers have been
discriminated against by Congress, which has excluded them from many of the
protections of labor laws. 20 2 State laws generally fail to fill in the gaps left by
federal legislation.203 Furthermore, paid caretakers' employment takes place in
the employers' "private sphere" and therefore is not perceived as "a real
,,204job. Unlike most employees, who work in a place of business conducted for
profit, and usually with other people, in-home caretakers are often expected to
blend in to their work environment, and are consequently isolated from peers
and support networks. 205 Many parents also take advantage of the fact that in-
200. This division of labor can be understood in terms of the prevalent ideological distinction
between menial and spiritual housework, as identified by Dorothy Roberts. This division allows parents
to find someone who will perform the menial components of childrearing-bathing, feeding, dressing,
chauffeuring, monitoring-so that parents can then devote whatever scarce time they have with their
children to their intellectual cultivation, without giving up (indeed intensifying!) their child-centered
childrearing ideology. Roberts adds that working mothers might not be able to devote quality time to
their children at all if they came home to face the chores that the caretaker performed during the day.
Roberts, supra note 98, at 51, 58.
201. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requirements regarding minimum wage and record-
keeping apply to domestic workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(0 (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2 (2007). However,
employers are allowed to deduct from the minimum wage "reasonable costs of room and board," thus
legalizing paying resident caretakers less than the minimum wage. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
188, at 30 & n.185 (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000), which
provides workers with additional compensation for every hour worked over forty hours a week, applies
only to employees who are "engaged in commerce" or employed in an enterprise which is. However,
some states (such as New York and Maryland) provide domestic workers overtime protection. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 188, at 30 n.182.
202. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) explicitly excludes domestic workers from its
protection. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). This disadvantage is at least partly responsible for domestic
workers' depressing wages. Silbaugh, supra note 176, at 74; Young, supra note 185, at 27. Domestic
workers are also excluded from the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-658
(2000). See 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2007). This exclusion is especially severe because OSHA covers other
single-employee workplaces and other workers entering private homes. Silbaugh, supra note 176, at 77.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination, does not apply to
most domestic workers because of its fifteen employee minimum. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2007);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 188, at 30.
203. Young, supra note 185, at 30-33 (reviewing state legislation and finding that States exempt
workers employed in private homes from minimum wage laws and from maximum hours provisions and
restrict their eligibility to unemployment benefits); see supra note 201.
204. HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 9; see also ROMERO, supra note 74, at 51-52 (adding
that housework has become fused with the roles of mother and wife and is therefore not considered
labor); Cheever, supra note 74, at 36 (quoting a participant in a "nanny-awareness class" in Brooklyn as
saying, "The main thing they told us was to be businesslike ... but it's hard to be businesslike when
you're going into someone's house and taking care of their children.").
205. PARRENAS, supra note 187, at 161-62 (noting that the problem is especially acute for live-in
caretakers, who "[o]ften feeling trapped[,] ... cannot help but see the enclosed space of the employer's
home as a prison"); Baquedano-L6pez, supra note 73, at 8 (documenting very little sharing of personal
information between paid caretakers, even though they spend substantial amounts of time together in the
same park in Los Angeles); Uttal & Tuominen, supra note 168, at 767 ("[T]he private location of [in-
home caretaking] contributes to the potential for exploitation."). Isolation also facilitates employers'
abuse of workers. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 188, at 6. Combined with the diversity of
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home caretakers' job requirements are ambiguous.206 Caretakers are frequently
"asked to do work--dog walking, ironing, serving at dinner parties-that was
not part of the job description and was not included in the original salary, 2 °7
and some employers expect them to be available for extremely long
208
workdays. Consequently, caretakers report that "they feel like 'objects' or
'things' within a labor process where they have little control, where they.have
few interactions with other workers, and where at any moment their job can be
taken away from them.'2°9 This feeling is further aggravated by the fact that
employers often resent developing personalized relationships with in-home
caretakers, and many want their employees to demand little in terms of parental
time, space, and attention.2 H Whatever restraints parents might normally have
are often removed by their sincere concern for their children's future well-
being. I As one New York mother put it rather extremely, "I want someone
who cannot leave the country, who doesn't know anyone in New York, who
basically does not have a life. I want someone who is completely dependent on
me and loyal to me and my family."
212
Poor job conditions and the high risk of mistreatment have led some
scholars to doubt that paid in-home caretaking is as beneficial to children as
parents and courts seem to think. They argue that paid in-home caretaking, as it
is practiced today, may nourish selfishness, racism, and entitlement in
children.2 13 Some children come to view relationships as potential employment
relationships and experience the power of money to buy affection. 2 14 They
employers and workers, isolation also leaves little opportunity for workers to organize and bargain
collectively to improve their conditions.
206. Hochschild, supra note 73, at 35; see Colen, supra note 197, at 63; Richardson & Torres,
supra note 177, at 88-89.
207. Hochschild, supra note 73, at 35; see HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 138; ROMERO,
supra note 74, at 131; WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 17; Richardson & Torres, supra note 177, at 83
(quoting an employee who in addition to taking care of a newborn baby and a three-year-old was
expected to "clean the house, do the laundry and run errands" with no addition to her salary of thirty-
five dollars per week).
208. See HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 141-42 (reporting that employers required
caretakers to sleep in the children's room, even when allocated a private room for their usage, and
expected paid caretakers to remain on duty even when the employers were present).
209. lbarra, supra note 186, at 166.
210. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 26; see also HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, supra note 73, at 172-75
(arguing that mothers who engage in full-time employment wish to avoid or minimize personal
relationships with their in-home caretaker, and are less likely than homemakers to view the employee as
their extension); Colen, supra note 197, at 54-56 (finding that many of the women she interviewed had
difficulties with the asymmetrical social relations of care and domestic work); Hondagneu-Sotelo, supra
note 74, at 68 ("Many employers go out of their way to minimize interactions with their domestic
employees, but Latina immigrant women, especially those who look after children, crave personal
contact."); Richardson & Torres, supra note 177, at 78 (finding that few employers choose to become
friends with their employees, and that even the friendly employers are careful not to tread on the
boundaries of the employment relationship).
211. Tronto, supra note 9, at 43.
212. CHANG, supra note 126, at 109-10.
213. Tronto, supra note 9, at 40.
214. WRIGLEY, supra note 4, at 127-28; Baquedano-L6pez, supra note 73, at 18.
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learn to treat people as merely a means to an end and may come to expect that
others always be available to them. 2 15 It is problematic, therefore, for custody
judges to assume, without checking the specific work conditions, that paid care
in the child's home is quality care. Furthermore, the doctrinal limitations of
custody law obscure the harm inflicted on other children, who are not part of
the custody litigation before the court. Constrained by the goal of finding the
best care for the children whose custody they adjudicate, judges have no
reason-or legal ground-to take into account the price that the children of in-
home caretakers pay.216 The problem is most acute for immigrant caretakers,
especially undocumented ones, who often find it impossible to bring their own
children with them to the United States. 217 Not surprisingly, these children
report feelings of loss and sadness over this acute disruption in their
relationships with their mothers. 2 18 My aim in emphasizing the price
caretakers' children pay is not to cast blame on immigrant caretakers, who
usually find the separation from their families to be a constant cause of pain.
219
Rather, it is to note that discussing paid in-home caretaking as a care
arrangement within custody decisions hides the hardship experienced by
caretakers' children. The fact that this problem cannot be addressed within
custody law is not, in itself, a good enough reason to ignore the externalities of
this childrearing practice altogether.
C. Conclusion
The reasoning that judges apply in the "nanny cases" manifests and
reinforces the internal logic of concerted cultivation. First, automatically
considering in-home caretaking to be quality care is compatible with the belief
that good childrearing means providing the child with the constant attention of
an adult working to enhance the child's development and attuned to the child's
needs. Second, the attribution of the caretakers' work to the parents who hired
them mitigates the gap between parents' actual involvement in childrearing and
their perception-and society's--of what good parenting entails. Any legal
attempt to acknowledge the importance of caretakers' specific qualities would
215. Tronto, supra note 9, at 40.
216. Some of these children, who are in the United States, learn their place in the race and class
stratification through encounters with their mothers' employers and employers' children. Romero, supra
note 195, at 1669-70. Their mothers' attention, energy, and time are invested in their charges and thus
diverted from them. Sau-ling C. Wong, Diverted Mothering: Representations of Caregivers of Color in
the Age of "Multiculturalism," in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 67, 71-73
(Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994). Many have to care for siblings in their mothers' absence.
Romero, supra note 195, at 1664.
217. Hochschild, supra note 73, at 21.
218. ld. at 22; Rhacel Salazar Parrefias, The Care Crisis in the Philippines: Children and
Transnational Families in the New Global Economy, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra note 73, at 39, 42, 48,
50; Romero, supra note 195, at 1665-66.
219. Hochschild, supra note 73, at 21; Parrefias, supra note 218, at 41.
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shatter the parents' and the courts' illusion that parental care is the only care
that is irreplaceable. Thinking of paid caretakers as disposable is important to
satisfy the demands of concerted cultivation. Parents can hire paid caretakers to
spend a significant amount of time with their children, demanding that they act
with love and maternal warmth, and at the same time, devalue the caretaker-
child relationship and the caretaker's contributions to the child's development.
As it now stands, the practice of in-home caretaking is also likely to
reaffirm racial hierarchies and traditional gender roles. Rather than a feminist
victory, this practice represents an upper-middle-class feminist concession.
220
Instead of motivating men to take upon themselves an equal amount of child
care responsibilities,2 21 insisting on subsidized quality day care,222 or pushing
workplaces to accommodate women's caretaking responsibilities, 223 in-home
caretaking facilitates a bogus achievement, buying the liberation of the wealthy
few without undermining the foundations of women's domesticity.2 2 4 As
Audrey Macklin has noted, "The grim truth is that some women's access to the
high-paying, high-status professions is being facilitated through the revival of
semi-indentured servitude. Put another way, one woman is exercising class and
citizenship privilege to buy her way out of sex oppression." 2 5 Before courts
220. See, e.g., Hochschild, supra note 73, at 20 ("Two women working for pay is not a bad idea.
But two working mothers giving their all to work is a good idea gone haywire.").
221. ROMERO, supra note 74, at 128.
222. Jean H. Baker, Child Care: Will Uncle Sam Provide a Comprehensive Solution for American
Families?, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239 (1990); Heather S. Dixon, National Daycare: A
Necessary Precursor to Gender Equality with Newfound Promise for Success, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 561 (2005).
223. Most American workplaces do not consider employees' child care responsibilities as a factor
in defining their demands and expectations for employee performance. Kelly, supra note 168, at 1051-
52; see also EYER, supra note 154, at 65 (arguing that the workplace presents women with "the maternal
wall, which prevent[s] them from both working and caring for their families"). Scholars have challenged
the contemporary organization of the workplace and advocated changes that would accommodate
employees' caretaking responsibilities. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 285 (2004) (demanding that the state "oversee and facilitate the
restructuring of the workplace so that market institutions accommodate caretaking"); NANCY FOLBRE,
THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 227 (2001) (offering a different structure for
paid parental leaves that would ensure parental attention for infants and promote gender equality); Mary
Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 70 (2002) (arguing that jobs can and should be
restructured to accommodate mothering). For opposition to proposed subsidies for parents, see Mary
Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the
Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001).
224. Grace Chang, Undocumented Latinas: The New "Employable Mothers, " in MOTHERING,
supra note 216, at 259, 277 (noting how necessity has driven minority communities to construct
alternatives to female domesticity). Moreover, most in-home caretakers are hired and supervised by
women, so that even as employers, middle-class women retain substantial responsibility for child care.
ROMERO, supra note 74, at 128.
225. Audrey Macklin, On the Inside Looking In: Foreign Domestic Workers in Canada, in MAID IN
THE MARKET: WOMEN'S PAID DOMESTIC LABOUR 13, 34 (Wenona Giles & SedefArat-Koq eds., 1994).
The willingness of women in developing countries to migrate to developed countries and perform low
wage jobs is enhanced, among other things, by the collapse of welfare in their countries of origin,
stemming from the economic policy of developed countries. CHANG, supra note 126, at 123-24.
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can turn to in-home caretaking as a solution to parental inadequacy or
unavailability, we need to rethink caretakers' status in society.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary custody law is concerned with children's well-being. When
the family is disrupted, courts try to provide children with optimal child care.
At first glance, it seems that the "nanny cases" can be explained within the
principles of child custody doctrine: Courts credit parents for providing quality
substitute care and order inadequate parents to employ caretakers because
somebody has to take care of these children.
This Article argues that this doctrinal explanation does not sufficiently
account for the way courts perceive in-home caretaking. Why do courts see
caretakers' care as care done by parents, when they do not do so with other
types of child care? Why do courts and scholars insist that there is "a world of
difference" between paid caretakers and parents, while they are willing to
accept, in other contexts, that day-to-day child care over long periods of time
creates special attachments between children and caretakers that should be
legally protected?
By analyzing in-home caretaking in the context of the current legal and
cultural regulation of parenthood, this Article provides an alternative
explanation for the appeal of in-home caretaking and its peculiar
conceptualization as care without a caretaker. It argues that the characteristics
of in-home paid caretaking-intense one-on-one care in the child's home-
help to conceal the discrepancy between a legal regime in which parenting is
still regarded as an exclusive status and the reality of contemporary family life
in which many tasks associated with parenting are regularly performed by
people who are not legally considered parents. The "nanny cases" bridge this
gap by valorizing one-on-one child care while erasing the caretaker herself. Her
care is instead credited to the parents, creating an ideal (but fictional) legal
family. This conceptualization obscures the important role paid in-home
caretakers can come to play in children's lives and causes dual-earner families
to appear as if they abide the two-parent model when in practice they do not.
This Article demonstrates that courts do not take such a favorable view of
other caretaking arrangements because they do not lend themselves to this
conceptualization. Day care is incompatible with concerted cultivation, and as a
result it is not seen as parental enough. It takes place outside the child's home,
it does not provide children the full attention of one adult focused solely on the
children's needs and development, and it is hard to use the notion of parental
supervision as a conceptual tool for attributing the caretaker's work to the
parent. Kin care, in contrast, is considered too much like parental care. We see
relatives, their motivations, and their relationships with children as independent
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of the parents-therefore the care that they provide cannot be attributed to the
parents in the same way that paid caretakers' care can. Given that paid in-home
caretaking is the most expensive child care option, the courts' ideological
preference for this care has the potential to reinforce existing inequalities.
Parents who cannot buy a substitute parent for their children do not enjoy the
same advantages; whether they leave their child in a day care or with relatives,
courts do not see parents as performing the actual care. Only parents who
employ in-home caretakers have this privilege.
What alternatives does the legal system have? The less promising route is
to acknowledge the parental role of paid caretakers by changing their status vis-
A-vis the individual child that they care for. Some in-home caretakers develop
an emotional attachment to their charges and experience a feeling of loss when
the relationship is severed by the parents.226 If acting "motherly" is an
important job requirement, the emotional investment of paid caretakers could
be rewarded by some legal protection to the caretaker-child bond.
This approach is extremely impractical. To begin with, it requires too stark
a departure from the current legal doctrine and cultural norms. If part of paid
caretakers' appeal in the eyes of judges and parents is that they are perceived as
posing no threat to the exclusive family, a complete reversal of their status is
highly unlikely anytime soon. It is also impractical because it would be
relatively easy for parents to avoid any conditions set to trigger the awarding of
such status. For example, if parents knew that by employing the same caretaker
over a certain period of time they would expose themselves to a legal claim for
visitation, they would simply replace caretakers more often, thus reinforcing
the perception of caretakers as disposable. Parents' desire to avoid the risk of
caretakers' parental rights would result in impossible strains on the
employment relation. However impractical, the suggestion to afford in-home
caretakers parental privileges and the strong, almost instinctive, objection it
provokes are very revealing, because they highlight the fact that employing in-
home caretakers is an activity with externalities currently not paid for by the
beneficiaries of this activity. If it is unthinkable that any employer would hire
an in-home caretaker should the terms of employment recognize the caretaker-
child relationship, it means that a segment of the population's way of life is
currently made possible only because it does not pay the full price for its
choices.
Instead of seeking a solution on the individual household level, I argue that
reattaching care to caretakers can-and should-provoke us to question the
nuclear family model and the parental exclusivity doctrine that builds upon it.
Fully acknowledging the parental role of caretakers can be a positive step
toward rethinking parental exclusivity and replacing it with a doctrine that
226. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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better reflects the fact that childrearing in many contemporary American
families is a collaborative rather than an exclusive project.
Moreover, realizing that paid in-home caretakers raise American children
can bring about a change in their status in society. Caretakers frequently face
unclear job requirements, isolation, separation from their families, little control
over the substance or schedule of their work, and sometimes disrespect and
even racism. These problems cannot be solved at the individual household
level: They require a systemic solution. As I noted earlier, some scholars have
already argued for changes in employment law to extend protections awarded
to workers in general to domestic workers, including in-home caretakers. In
addition, a substantial change in immigration rules is necessary. Currently paid
caretakers are treated as disposable, unskilled laborers who can be disconnected
from their families, imported, and later discarded. Acknowledging the
fundamental role of paid in-home caretakers requires the accommodation of
their basic needs not only as workers, but as parents as well. The fact that it
might be considered preposterous that in-home caretakers be recognized as
"American mothers" and receive especially favorable treatment by immigration
authorities only shows that society is not currently paying the full cost of one of
its growing child care solutions.
Feminists have long struggled to change policies that hinder women's
attempts to combine motherhood with gainful employment. A policy that
allows the wealthy few to integrate professional work with maternal obligations
by pretending that they perform these obligations themselves is potentially
detrimental to other mothers who cannot afford this charade. Furthermore, in
valuing "nanny care" as the best care while discarding the caretaker as
irrelevant, courts devalue care work generally, and subordinate in-home paid
caretakers. A feminist victory that creates such obvious injustice is no victory
at all.
For many there is a clash between what they think of as good parenting and
what they do as parents. This clash is mirrored by the legal system, which
pretends we do one thing (provide children with intensive care by two parents)
even when we do another (provide children with intensive care by third
parties). I suggest we see in-home caretaking for what it really is, even if this
realization requires us to rethink the legal definitions and cultural perceptions
of parenthood.
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